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CHAPTER ONE.

INTRODUCTION 1 AYRES 1 THE SOCIAL THEORIST
!-i

The writer first became interested in the social theor,y of Clarence

~---:----c-~=~o-_- ~

Edwin Ayres while working on papers in sociological theory and social
stratification at the University of the Pacific.

In studying the theories

of Thorstein Veblen and Leslie A. White, it was found that an underlying
similarity existed among these writers and Clarence E. Ayres.

The main

thread of similarity was the prominence given to technology as _the prime
.
1
engine of change •.
Other sociologists and anthropologists had made technological and
economic factors basic to their social theory, and several in addition had
emphasized these factors in varying degrees.
Ogburn, F.

These included:

William F •.

s.

Chapin, Harry Elmer Barnes, George Peter Murdock, John R.
.
2
Connnons, Albert Galloway Keller, and Howard w. Odum. Yet, it seemed that

Ayres's position was equally as well formulated, but he was never mentioned
as being an exponent of this position.

1Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: !!! economic studz
institutions, (New York: The Modern Library, 1934); Leslie A. White,
~Evolution of Culture, (New York1 McGraw Hill, 1959).

2f

2william Fielding Ogburn, Social Change :!!.tt:!! ResEect to Culture !.!!!!
Original Nature (New York: The Viking Press, 1950); F. s. Chapin, Cultural
Change (New York: The Century Co., 1928); Harry Elmer Barnes, Sociology and
Political Theo!:X (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1924); Geor€!e Peter Hurdock,
·
Social Structure (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949); John R. Commons,
The Economics of Collective Action (New York: The ~acmillan Co., 1950)t
Albert GallowayKeller, Societal Evolution (New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1915); Howard W, Odum, Man's Quest for Social Guidance (New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 1927).
-

n
~-~--------·-

2

Why was Ayres omitted?

It may very "'oTell have been that Ayres's position

as a social theorist was in doubt because he wrote primarily as an economist.
Ayres had come to the study of economics by a circuitous route which involved
first the study of philosophy and later the. acceptance of teaching positions
in the field of econoroics,3 Ayres had written his Ph.D. dissertation at the
University of Chicago in Philosophy (1917).

But even in his early writings,

he showed interest in the thought of Thorstein Veblen, who along with John
Dewey, were to become his mentors.

It was from Veblen that Ayres had come to·

see that the patterns of human b~havior and social behavior had two fundamental
thrusts, not merely rational and

emot~onal,

as psychologists were prone to

point out, but the "workmanship" of man by which Veblen meant technology and
institutional behavior patterned upon ceremony, status, and tradition.

Veblen used

many terms to describe this latter behavior, such as, "waste, 11 "pecuniary
employments," and "imbecility," btit its main characteristic was ceremony and
ritual.

There was a basic irrationality in man and a great procli-vity on his

part for display and ceremony,

Ayres s'il:mmarized Veblen's .·contribution

succinctly when toward the end of his life he published a new introduction

3Biographical sketch on Ayres: Jacques Cattell, Director~ of American
Scholars, Second Edition, 1951, pp. 32-33: "Born Lowell, Mass, May 6, 1891.
A. B. Brown, 1912, A.N. 1914; Harvard 1913; fellow Chicago, 1916-1917, Ph.D.
1917. Instructor Philosophy, Chicago, 1917-1920, Assoc. Prof. Amherst College
1920-1923; Prof. Reed College, 1923-1924; Assoc. Editor~~ Republic, 19241925; lecturer in Philosophy and adviser experimental college, Wisconsin,
1928-1929; Prof. Econ., TeXas, 1930. Director of Consumer Division, u.s.
Dept. of Labor, 1936; Visiting Professor of Washington (Seattle), 1940;
Summersa Prof. Ohio State, 1927; New York Urdversity, 1930. Philosophical
Association, Economic Association (Board of Editors, American Economic
Review, 1935-1937); s.w.s. Science Asso~iation, (pres., 1939), Social
Philosophy, Economic Theory and its history; institutional economics. 11
Ayres died in 1972.

,...,.

h- -------·- --- -

, _ __
to two of his earlier works&
Than~

(1929).

Sciences

The False Messiah (1927) and Holier
~

He wrote a

g~-~=
ri

--

L.:_~-----~-

It is now generally understood that human behavior--all human
behavior and all organized social patterns--present two distinct
and contrasting.(though not unrelated) aspects to the uninvolved
observer. From the earliest times of which we have knowledge,
down to the present human behavior presents an amazing contrast
il-------=o=-cf:_·-=·l·_:ca--=t=i=o=n=al~i==ty and irra tionali_tJ"-,_Of_:_s_ens_e_and_nonsense-.-of'.~----------o---- - - economy and waste. This contrast was Veblen's master principle.
As the contrast between "making things" and "making money" it
was the master principle of his economics and rarhaps his
significant contribution to the dismal science. . . ·
Don Martindale once wrote about Veblen in the_ following manner&
The reason why Veblen's theoretical importance tended to be
obscured was the general sociological rather than specifically
economic nature of his theories. Economists thought of his
work as tangential to the main business of economics. And as
long as sociologists·have treated him as an economist, they
have not--and fraquently still do not look at Veblen's work
as a type of sociological theory. Hence one of America's most
original theorists is at times denied recognition as a theorist•S
-What Martindale intimates is that social theory does not have to come from
professors of Sociology to be germane. _It should be judged on its own merit
and is not the monopoly of sociologists.

It is authenticated by its usage

as a model or by recognition of its analytical depth.
It seemed to this writer that Ayres's sociological thought deserved
credit, i f for no other reason, than it was obvious that he clarified in
great measure the positions of Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey.

But there

were other reasons as well.

4c1arence E. Ayres, Science' The False Messiah (1927; rpt. Clifton, N.J.a
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1973);-aolier Than Tho~ (1929; rpt. Clifton,
N.J .a Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1973). ,p.-fV.- ·

5non Martindale, _The Nature~ !;vPes of §oci.<:>logical ~. (Bostons
Houghton Hifflin Company~T§6o), p. 399.

4
C. Wright Hills, who had been a student of Ayres while attending the

-

Univeristy of Texas in the 1930s, had praised Ayres's understanding of
Veblen. ·He believed Ayres

taught Sociology at Columbia University from 1946 until 1962.

"'----c--

He

He was an

exponent of interactionism, and some have labeled him as the foremost
representative of the conflict model of sociological theory in the United
States. 7

Talcott Parsons, one of the leading exponents of the other basic

sociological orientation in the United States, the structural functionalist ·
model, was also a student of Ayres while at Amherst, at the end of World.
War I.
thought.

Ayres seemed qu.i.te oblivious to the influence he had upon their
According to Gillam, there were great feuds between Mills and

Parsons over different sociological perspectives, and yet it is impossible
to .know how much of their perspective was gained from Ayres.
former students commented along these linesa

8

One of Ayres's

"That two outstanding students

of A::fres could represent such divergence of approach may indicate a certain
confusion or ambiguity in his thought or at least in his classroom presentation. " 9 But a careful reading of both Mills. and Parsons does reveal some

6c, Wright Mills, Images of Man (New York:
1960), p. 336, n. 1.

-------

!...!

to be the foremost interpreter of Veblen. 6 Mills

went on to become one of the leading sociologists in the United States.

---

~

George Braziller, Inc.,

71-lilliam A. Kolb. "Sociology and the Christian Doctrine of Man, II in
Religion and ContemE_orary Western Culture, ed., Edward Cell (New Yorka
Abingdon Press, 1967), p~ 365a Leonard Broom and Phillip Selznick,
Sociolo~, Fifth Edition (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973),
p. 6; Martindale, p. 373.

~icha.rd Gillam, "The Intellectual Rebela C. Wright Mills, 1914-1946,"
(Unpubl. M.A. Thesis, Columbia University, 1966), p. 40.
9Rick Tilman, 11 Value Theory, Planning and Reform a Ayres as Incrementalist
and Utopian,•• Journal of Economic Issues, VIII, (December, 1974), p. 706.,
n. 23.
- ·
·

~,~~~~-

.5
similarities to Ayres's thought, and it should be remembered that Mills and
Parsons by no means present totally consistent systems.
~:-~--

"::I __

Walter Rochs Goldschmidt, Professor of AnthropOlogy, at the University
of California, dedicated his book, Man • s Wa:v.:

!. _E!:eface to

~

-----~---

---~

understanding. __

10 to Ayres and others who were his teachers, among them

of human society

Alfred L. Kroeber and Robert H. Lowie.

While Go_ldschmidt_d_o_e_s_no_t_citft._____c__________

Ayres specifically in the text, it is obvious that he shows great indebtedness
to him in chapters four and five where technology is discussed.

Ayres also

taught Marion L. Levy, who is Professor of Sociology at Princeton University,
as .well as David Hamilton, who is Professor of Economics at New :Hexico
University.

There are probably

m~

other students whom Ayres taught in the

ranks of sociology teachers who are unknown to the wr-iter, but if this were
all, it would indicate considerable influence.
It is the thesis of this study, that although Ayres's theory of progress
is damaging to his sociological theory as a whole, his theory of the basic
dichotomy of social action; that of technology and ceremonialism, deserves
greater credit

than it has received and is profoundly significant sociologically.

It is obvious to anyone who has ever read through the works of Clarence
Ayres that he was a man of many interests.

He was interested in anthropology,

psychology, history, the humanities, and the arts.
categories

How do you place individuals in

who show such a versatile depth in human thought?

student has commenteda

A former

~'

"A reader unfamiliar with the work of Clarence Ayres,

taking a casual glance at his writing, easily could mistake him for art

10vTalter Rochs Goldschmidt, Man's ~aye !. pref!!£.~ to~ underst8!ldin,g
of' human .~E,~:_ie.~z, (New Yorke The World Publishing Company, 19.59). .

6

historian, musicologist, philosopher, or literary critic.

His published

work; written over a period of nearly sixty years, reveals encyclopedic
knowledge and an ·incredibly broad range of interests. 1•11
Ayres seemed to have had an interest in psychoanalysis as a tool for
solving human behavior problems.

He taught Allen \iheelis, a practicing

psychiatrist and psychoanalyst in the San Francisco

B~

area, while he was

a student at the University of Texas, and Wheelis has written a book which
deals in large part with Ayres's "technological" and ''institutional"
12
concepts.
It should be stated quite clearly that Ayres never failed to give
credit to Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey for their contribution to his
germinal ideas about the basic dichoto~ in human social behavior. His
.
13
last published writing, 111hich was referred to above, was a new introduction
to his older works z Science:

.!h! False Messiah and Holier Than Thou. This

introduction was written at the insistence of Joseph Dorfman of Columbia
..

University, another first-rate Veblenian scholar.

Dorfman was

an

avid

admirer of Ayres's interpretation of Veblen's theory and requested that
Ayres write a new introduction to these two older works explaining how
Veblen's ideas were manifested in them •

. 11Tilman, P• ~9.
12n1en ·Wheelis, The Quest for Identity, (New York: W. W. Norton and •
Co., Inc~, 1958), especially pp. 174-205,
13see Page 3 Above,

?-

--- -

~-------------

7
In this new introduction, Ayres revealed some of his own development
.

in thought.

.

He stated that he had early been aware of human behaVior as a
-

dichotomy, but that he bad failed in these two works to identify the two
aspects of human behavior as a ''dichotomy."

Veblen had never used the term

as such, although dichotomies abounded throughout hiS writings.

Gospel. of Technology" article to be included in American

Ayres

Philos~

Toda;r

and Tomorrow, edited by Horace M. Kallen and Sidney Hook. 14 This article was .
first published in 193.5.

Ayres stated that "Veblen made the dichotoli\Y

of technology and ceremonialism his-master principler and in my later
efforts to clarify the 'Institutional Conception' of economic process and
economic policy I have followed his lead. 111 .5 But Ayres went on to admit
that he was astonished that he had not clearly used the term "dichotomy"
earlier than 1932.

He reflecteda

I am mildly astonished to find that Science: The False Messiah
is concerned With one aspect of human nature ··aiid_ 'or all organized·
society, and Holier Than Thou with the other. Neither is so
identified, this I do not'"""Uilderstand. For I was already an
, av01..red Veblenian, and would not have hesitated to identify my
ideas with· hj.s. But perhaps the explanation of this anomaly
is simply that at this time my ideas were too inchoate to be
identified even
my own mind with the dichotomy which later
seemed so clear. ·
·

tg

14clarence Edwin Ayres, "The Gospel of Technology," in .American Philosophy
Today and Tomorrow, eds., Horace M. Kallen and Sidriey Hook,· (1935J rpt.
Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), pp. 2.5-42,
·
1.5Ayres, Hessiah,
16Ibid.

p. v.

_;:-

------------

8
It. was John Dewey, Ayres said, who influenced him most on his theory
of value.

Ayres originally taunted his older professors about their

insistence upon maintaining some type of value scheme in the period when
value-relativism was taking hold.
of certainty or design.

"Darwinism" had exploded all such notions

Adam Smith's belief, that a "guiding hand'' led

men through self-interest toward an end which no one had in mind, that
·is the common good,17 was an attempt to ordain "nature" with adesign that
had been lost in the demise of supernaturalism.

But while Ayres originaJ..ly·

espoused the new "cultural relativism," he was not entirely happy with it.

--

He admitted that even in Holier Than Thou this . displeasure was partially
visible.

It was revealed with his displeasure of Sumner's dualistic

·"folkways" and "mores."

He did not appreciate the dualistic implications

of one's being higher than the other.
Mores were moral sanctions for Sumner and therefore essential for
usage in a particular cultural setting.
were more akin to etiquette.

Folkways were not binding and

Ayres questioned the advisability of Sumner's

division, .since both were basically customs.

How can you make one higher

than the other and be consistent to Sumner's theory that custom makes
anything right?

Ayres's reasoning was

The theory of Folkways seems to be that morals as well as
etiquette are only customs. But there is another way in which
this theory can be taken. We assume that conventions are
trivial because they are customary. And therefore we assu.me
further if morals are customary too, they are also trivial.
·But if we begin at the other end, assume that morals are of

17c. E. Ayres, Toward a Reasonable Society, ( Austin, Texas:
of Texas Press, 19bl), p.-7.

University

ri ------------------

9

greatest possible importance, and that they are customary, and
then move to the proposition that folkways are customary too,
there is no reason at all for our concluding that the folkways
are trivial because they are customary. On the contrary,
reasoning in that direction we should properly make the
inference that, folkways being customary in the same sense as
mores, they are just as important if not just as sacred as the
mores. Indeed, Sumner's distinction between the two if made
entirely on ground of popular prejudice in the matter. 8
Veblen too, earlier than Sumner and more capably according to
had espoused folkways as the

onl~

guides to behavior.

~ ~~~- ------ -

-------~~~

~es,

But Ayres believed

the relativism of Veblen to have been essentially different from that of
Sumner in that Veblen was conscious. of the life-process as bej.ng dependent
upon tool-behavior and basically for "the good of the species."

He noted

that Veblen was aware, in a way that Sumner was not, of human life as a
locus of value through "workmanship."

He stated':

"Veblen saw this.

As

I have suggested even when he is intent upon pointing out the utter
conventionality of 'waste,• ho says in effect that human life and well
being is a quite differentmatter,"

19

The difference between Sumner

am

Veblen was that Sumner understood customs as the locus of value· whU.e
Veblen understood human needs as the locus of
Ayres admitted that he was a
John Dewey's Theory of Valuation.

~•moral

value.~

agnostic" until he encountered

Previously, he urged his colleagues to

"come clean" and admit that there were no "guiding rules" to establishing
values, one custom being as significant as any other. . He was heading for
.

.·

.

a volta-face, but originally he denounced the hypocricy of value preference:

18Ayres, Holi~, pp.

49-50.

19Ayres, Messiah, p. x,

10
"If value judgments give effect to tribal practices ~ nothing else, then

there are no absolute values,

What we think good and right is what our

~

- - -

~~-=:~ -------

community values,·

As human life is organized it can be nothing more,

There

are no transcultural values."20
A change of attitude occurred, however, with his understanding of John

Dewey's Theorz of Valuation.

He said that he was awakened from his dogmatic

slumber and to. a new understanding of how valuation does occur in the human
species, not through dictates of custom but rather. through the need
for
.
man to find answers to the basic problems of life, for example, health,
survival, cooperation, tools, conservation, workmanship, and the other
necessities of the making of life.

In this developnent, Ayres can be seen

as standing in the h1xmanistic tradition of some current sociologists, such
as C. Wright Hills, Irving Louis Horowitz, Alvin Gouldner, Norman Birnbaum,
Seymour Lipset, Daniel Bell, Robin M. Williams, Jr., and Robert Nisbet to
name but a few. 21

He stateda

• , • To be sure nothing mitigates the obscurantism of
"imbecile" institutions. But institutional archaism is
not .the whole of life. There is always the technological
process, and the continuity of that process means that it
is a locus of value no less definite than institutional
taboos. The technological process is what Dewey called
"a means-ends continum." Human life itself is tho "locus"
of value--not in the animistic sense of totem and taboo
but in the continuously pro~~ssive sense of the "instinct"
(or process) of workmanship.

20Ibid.
2 1Donald A. Hansen, An Invitation ~ Critical Sociolo&, (New York&
The Free Press, 1976), p. xiii.

22Ayres, Messiah, p. x.

n

;-;
..-,~---------
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\'ihat Dewey accom:plishod then was to put back into the vacuum of "moral
agnosticism," not transcendental values, or historical order, or natural
~---

meanings which were imposed upon the world but rather a means of evaluation,
a process of judging.

It was never a.certainty; it was always experimental.

But it was a tool that could be used to solve one problem before moving on
to other problems.

Dewey made the following comments on this matters

••• No human activity operates in a vacuum; it acts in the
world and has materials upon which and through which it
produces results. On the other hand, no material--air, water,
metal, wood, etc.--is means save as it is employed in some
human activity to accomplish something. When "organization .
of activities" is mentioned, it always includes within itself
organization of the materials existing in the world in which
we live. That organization which is the "final" value for
each concrete situation of valuation thus forms part of the
existantial conditions that have to be taken into account 1n
further formation of desires and interests or valuations. • •23.
Gruchy states the following concerning Ayres's reliance upon Dewey:
• • • p..'-lilosophel:'S, going back to Plato and Aristotle and
continuing up to the advent of John Dewey's philosophy of
pragmatism around 1900, had a dualistic approach to the
study of reality. They separated human experience or the
actual daily round of events from-what was aileged to be a
more uniform and ultimate scheme of things lying behind the
flux of actual events. The behind-the-scenes scheme of things
was asserted to be perfect, changeless and the reflection of
some Ultimate Reason or eternal spirit. This classicai
philosophical approach takes society to be fundamentally
chru1geless and static. There is no inner spring or factor
at work in the world which is an independent source of
dynamic change, and which would, if it existed, necessarily
push the world along an evolutionar,y path. According to
the interpretation of classical philosophers science or
knowledge accumulates. but daes not change the underlying
essential order of things,2
•
.
·
·

23John Dewey, Theory of Valuati.on, (Chicago:
Press, 1939), P• 50.

University of Chicago

24Allan G. Gruchy, fontempora.~ Econo~.£ Th~, (Clifton, N. J.:
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1972), PP• 90··91.

12
Gruchy elaborates further upon AJTes's development of dichotomous relationships
as the essence of the life-situation in the following statementa
Ayres, like John Dewey, has made a major break from
classical ninateenth century philosophy. Following Dewey,
Ayres has abandoned the dualism·that runs through standard
philosophy. Dewey takes society to be a life process in
which there is rio such thing as a dualism between what is
seen and what is behind the scenes. There is no changeless,
static or orderly process behind the. life process of mankh1d.

n--- ---

---------------

~--------~Tho-~~fe-proee5s~i~us~rrat-±t-is--people-~th=e~p=r=o~c~e~s~s--~------------------

of acting, experimenting, accumulating scientific knowledge
and altering the actual scheme of things with the aim of
improving ·social well-being. All is unity. Biologically
mind and body are inseparable, and lifewise, from the
pragmatic philosophical point of new, there is no
separation between what is mental and what is material. 25
Ayres never lost sight of the ·fact that Dewey paved the way for him
to see clearly the institutionalism of Veblen and the technological efforts ·'
of man (the "workmanship" of Veblen and the "instrumentalism" of Dewey),

but he never really doubted that the conceptual framework would.have
·eventually been understood by him, even without
was greater than any individual "originator".
.

.

.

.

them, for the "process"

He sta.teda.
.·

Ny own ideas have been chieny formed, so far as I can judge,
by reflection upon the work of John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen;
but the importance of such men derives not from personal
authority nor even from any notable originality, but rather
from the clarity with which they have served as mouthpieces
for the culture they express. What they have voiced is
important, it seems to me, because it is obvious and mandatory. Thus I regard Dewey's "instrw11ental" philosophy and
the "institutional" economics which derives from Veblen·
(though he did not christen it) as almost identical expressions
of an a~gst ine~-i table trend's the trend of technology and
science.
.

Z5Ibid., P• 92.
26Ayres, Gos:pel, P• 27. ·

13
Th1.s writer has proposed as a part of his thesis for this study of·
Ayres's social thought that C. E. Ayres developed the thought of both
Veblen and Dewey beyond their original points of reference to a new social

...j ___

-

~

g
~

~---

~-=-

theory, the theory of the dichotomy of technology and institutionalism.

,.....,

---------~

--

While Veblen did not have a chance to know of Ayres's progression along
these lines, Dewey did, and once stateda
• • • while a numb l"_Of writ~rs_haye_bro_ught_f'o~a~d_the_fact!'l:_ _ _ _ _~--~--which are involved in this view {Instrumentalism), Dr. Clarence
Ayres, as far as I . am aware was the first one explicitly to ·
call science a mode of technology, It is probable that I
might have avoided a considerable amount of misunderstanding
i f I had systematically used "technolocy" instead of
"instrumentalism" in connection with the view I pUt forth ·
regarding the distinctive quality of science of lmowledge. 2 7
Although Ayres himself later remarked that the term "technolo€r.V" also had
its limitations, the search for a term of greater pertinence seemed
fru:i.tless.

28

It is obviously impossible in the light of the extensive nature of
Clarence Ayres's works to cover them in detail.

Certainly, this writer .

realizes that he is not competent to judge A:fres 's economic thought.
.

.

It is then to the ·social thought of .Ayres that this study will be directed.
Since Ayres is constantly referring to the development of "man," we shall not
substitute "human species," a reference he occasionally used, but will only
make clear that ''man" is used in this study generically.

27John Dewey, Problems
p. 291 n.

£f Men,

28Ayres, Society, p. 277.

(New Yorkr

Philosophical Libraey, 1946) ,

14
The attempt in Chapter Two will be to show how Ayres developed in his
understanding of human

n~ture

and to show how he observed the self as a

L'
~---

complex-biological,

socia~

and symbolic (cultural).

In Chapter Three, the

.~----

"......

--------

----~--~---

attempt will be to present Ayres's views on the basic dichotom,y which made
up his sociological framework, the "Institutional" and
framework.

"Technolo~ical"

Here some contributing factors to his development will be

considered, but emphasis will be placed upon Ayres's unique contribution.
In Chapter Four, emphasis will be given to a summary of Ayres's development
of his most controversial theoryl
which includes his theory of value.

the theory of technological progress
Finally, in Chapter Five, the

conclusion and critique will be presented and the thesis summarized.
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CHAPI'FR 'IWO,

THE NATURE OF THE SELF IN AYRES'S THOUGHT a

BIOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, AND SYMBOLIC (CULTURAL)
The Origin .of Man

..-----------

Along with Ayres's consumate interest in Thorstein Veblen's social.and.
economic thought and John Dewey's philosophy of instrumentalism, early in
.
'
1
lli-s caree--r-he had manifested an interest-m-th--e-oiological origin or·---cman===-,__...__ _:___ _~
It would seem that Ayres recognized that an understanding of the biolggical
evolution of man was the first prerequisite of any social theory about man's
behavior.

This was during a period, circa 1925-1932, when the meaning of .

Darwin's theory of evolutionary change was still being debated.
'

Veblen and

.

'

Dewey had made it clear in their writings that they were departing from the
common assumption as to the meaning of evolutionary theory.

Far more

important to them than the "proof" of organic development of the species
was the social evolution of man.

Ayres stated:

"For both the essential

problem was to view human activity, thought and even civilization as the·

.

performance of a strangely ingenious species of superape."

2

'

Ayres's

interest in this; period turned to Thomas Huxley, whom he thought had a ·

1c. E. Ayres, "The Gospel According to Darwln," The ~ .!_lepublic, LIV
(March 7, 1928) J c. E. Ayres, "Gog, Magog and Evolution," ~~Republic,
LII (September 7, 1927), p. 76; Clarence E. Ayres, Science: The False
Messiah, (1927; rpt. Clifton, N.J.' Augustus M. Kelley Publisii'e'rs, 19'73),
passim; Clarence E. Ayres, Holier Than ~, ( 1929; rpt. Clifton, . N•. J. 1 ·
· ·
Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1973), ;eassim; c. E. Ayres, Huxley, (New York a
W. W, Norton, 1932) •
·
· ··
. ·
2

c1arence Edwin Ayres, "The Gospel of Technology," American ,Philosophy
Tomorrow, eds, Horace M. Kallen and Sidney Hook, (1935r rpt.
Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), p. 28,
Today~
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more profound interpretation of biological evolution and its implications

s

than did Parwin himself • 3 ·

F---

G__ _

There were probably many reasons for this compelling interest in man's
origin and evolution on the part of A:yres.
his writing that man was

~faber

He had realized very early in

as well as homo

sapien~.

to find this "cultursJ." emphasis in Darwin and found only a
explanation of man's origin,

He sought
"biologica.l_"---~-----

This left him dissatisfied,

Ayres was also subjected to a conditioning process in his religious ·
training, his father being a minister,

He had long since determined that

what was designated as "religious truth" was merely social constructs
that had been given tra.-"lscendent meanings,

He was convinced, that is,

that religious meanings were institutional meanings, and that only
instrumental tools served to enhance man's well-being and to meet his
basic needs.

When one reads through Ayres's works, it is a surprise to

notice the very commanding knowledge he possessed of Biblical lore and
theological dogma,

There appears to be no doubt that he was an avid

student of the religious "m,isteries" and supposed "certainties."

Even

though he rejected these "institutional solutions" as being irrelevant to
solving the problems of the secular life, which he accepted as be:ing the
meaningful life; he wondered, it seems, how the instrumental process or
technological process succeeded in gaining at the expense of the
institutional proc.ess?. He knew, along with Veblen,• that the institutional
process was very strong and cohesive, some even thought it was invincible,

3Ayres, Huxley, PP• 233-242.

=-=--.- ..-.-.
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Ayres's interest in Thomas Huxley's theories concerning biological
evolution probably occurred as·the result of his father's interest in
Huxley.

At least it appears fro111 the Preface of Huxle;y:, written in 1932,

· that this was the case,

Therefore, after completing his doctoral dissertation

in 1917 on "The Nature of the Relationship Between Ethics and Economics,"
and having had published Science'&

The False Nessiah ( 1927) and Holier

!.h.!!!

Thou (1929), he turned his attention to Thomas HUxley and became one of
his biographers.
Ayres was an indefatigable reader.
anthropology and science.

His interests, as has been pomted out before,

were kaelidoscopic in nature.
on

~&•

He showed a very avid interest in

He was seeking to find out in this study

or so it seems, how man came to be hmnan.

to phrase the problem is as. follows:

Perhaps another way

What are the causal elements in the

evolutionary process which caused man to be more than animal while still
being very basically animal in biological make-up? What was. the engine
of change that propelled man into the center stage of the animal kingdom?
Most scientists had assumed because of "Darwinism" that man was distinctly
separated from his animal past only because of his enlarged brain and
natural selectivity.

Ayres was not satisfied with these answers.

Was

biological selectivity the only key to his change or did man exemplit.y a
quality unknown to other animals in a more distinctive "social sense?"

That

is, was man brutish and aggressive and oniy "slightly" above the primates
or did

4

h~

manifest differences which made him a superape?

Ibid. ' p. 2)6.

4

Was he a unique

-----------
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animal, a social

ar~

cultural creation, just as surely as a biological

Is there such an animal, Ayres seemed to be asldng, as_man

species?

~

~--~---

SL.tl.! man?
Ayres from the beginning, then, was interested· in the philosophical
as well as sociological questions concerning man.
of his. life tfhether he should be called more
_than

. ...
·

"•

He wondered at the .end

• • a woUld-be philosopher

a would-be economist."5
of .Han
-The Nature --

Ayres was convinced that man was not a "mind" and "body'' dualism.
Gruchy comments on this aspect of Ayres's thought, "According to Ayres the
concept of an inner nature underlying man's behavior is a relic of the time
t.ffien philosophers and social scientists held the view that 'body' and 'mind • are
separate· entities with mind being more substantial and fundamental than
·body. "

6 kyres represented himself early as a "behaviorist," using

quotc~tion marks to set this t~rminology off from any particular school of
psychology and its usage.
man in uniform terms.

He intended to signify a basic undex-sta.nding of

Man exhibited " • • • neurons and language mechanisms,"

or "mental and body functions" 7 together and not separately.

Dualism is .

the theory that reality is divided into at least bro ·independent categorie·s.
Therefore Ayres was opposed to philosophical idealism with its emphasis

5kj.-res, Hessiah, p. iii.
6Allan G. Gruchy, Co!ltemporaiT Economic Thought, ( C1.ifton, N.J.:
1-1. Kelley, 1972), P• 97.
·

7Ayres,

gosE£1•

P• 32,

Augustus

-
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upon man's mind as the "higher" integrator of his humanity, just as he was
opposed to those who tried to make man "spiritual" and "material'' in a

H

separate sense. ·Man was a material organism, albeit a different kind. of

;~-

animal.
Ayres was convinced, in part, at least, that man stood beyond mere
animal behavior in the sense that he made decisions and recognized certain
conseguences.

This position was always a part of his "behaviorism" and

it was to be the springboard toward a break with those social scientists
he termed, at a later date, to.be "moral agnostics."

He said&

If we now bring mankind once more irito sharp focus in the
foreground, we can perceive with startling vividness as
unpleasant factr that men do not all like the sa.m.e things
·nor hold the same things good. They do, of course, take a
unanimous satisfaction in "life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness." But men are never merely animals. If they
were, this 1.manimity would be significant. Cattle, also
have a preference for life; and life for them means plenty
of grass. But men are unanimous only about life. They do
11ot all live on the same things by any means. Indeed, they 8
arrange to stay alive by inconceivably different expedients.
Ayres was at this time, therefore, facing what was to be a crucial.issue
for him later, namely, how can man be a prOduct of his natural environment
and yet progress materially in a variety of ways.

At this point, the time

of his writing Huxley and "The Gospel of Technology," Ayres was convinced
that there was "• •• no such thing as 'true' culture.

Civilization

itself, in that sense is idolatrous and false,"9
Ayres had earlier. written about this dilemma of man's desire for

8

.Ayres~

Holier, P• 69.

91cyres, ~~ p. 26; f!uxle;'l, p. 242.

~-----

-~-
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certainty and his frustration at being a "natural" self in these passages:
Evolution may be unproved, it may remain always "finally"
inexplicable. It may suggest to some minds the probability
of an omnipotent propelling force. Nevertheless, the
descent of man remains the ascent of ape: not of any
existing ape, to be sure--we are not baboons or orangoutangst--but the ascent of some nicer ape, some
sanctified brute, predestined by Omnifetence to be
our parent, the undoubted anthropoidl

5~~'ri---.--

of science :1.s
that its sweeping generalizations, whetted to a razor-edge
of precision; nevertheless unfortunately concern realities
which though they may be spread over the length and breadth
of the universe are of an order of magnitude which excludes
them forever from the joys and sorrows of human intercourse.
Once more be it stated that we are concerned here not with
inventions and appliances but with scientific "truth." More
simply, scientific truths are not the truths that make men
free. They are to~ 1 true, too universal,.too empty of
humanity for that.

~~~~~-But---the-om:,-grtrat~intif'.rl:-ectual-d-efici-ency

Ayres was firmly convinced of two basic facts about man's development in ·
these early works:

(1) that man was not a "mind-body" entity but a

material entity; and (2) science offered no solace for those who "wished"
for the "verities" and "certainties" of human existence.
Ey 1932, Ayres had received fromhis exhaustive study of Veblen's
works, although .inchoately, ·the basic understanding of man 1 s dichotomous
nature.

In a dualistic approach to understanding man, two parts of man.

are sat over against each other as distinct entities and cannot be bridged,
whereas in a dichotomous approach to understanding human nature, man is
one, a singular entity, but there are two aspects. to his wholeness.

10Ayres, Messiah, p. 196.
11

~., P• 218.

Perhaps

---~----~-

----
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the best descriptive term, but still inadequate, to define this relationship

8-

R

is schism.

Ayres m-ote about this distinction in his The Th,eory. of
~---

Economic Progress&

;-j --

:.;_ _

,.-

-~------------

• • • Our worst confusions have had their origins in
dualism.
This difficulty could be resolved if it could be
clearly 1.n1derstood that the distinction of~t-=-h~e;__t~e~c_:_hn:_::_o_:_l:..:..:o::...sg"=i=-=c_:_a=l______~-- _ __
~-----·a"n~d-the ceremonial aspects of or~anized behavior is a
dichotomy but not a dualism. That·is, it undertakes to
distinguish two aspects of what is still a. single, ·
continuous activity both aspects of which are present
at all times. Indeed, they bound and def~ne each other
as do the obverse and reverse of. a coin.
·
.
c...: _ __
-

Thus Ayres eliminated any bifurcation .of human nature and considered man
to be made up of two

asp~

constituting a whole. While man's technological

activities can be distinguished from his institutional activities for
purposes of analysis, man is still both and most likely always will bo so.
Ayres was also convinced that biologically man was a
and changed little over thousands of years.

st~ble

quality

He wrote, "Biologically, man

is the same animal he has always been.· He is totally dependent for life

.

.

.

. 13

upon explo1,tat ion of plants ·and animals.• "

.

.

.

.

But socially he was a creature

of change,· "The rectuirements of the stomach are one thing. Conditions of
14
life are another."
So change altered the human outlook throu~h reasoning,.
12

.
.
E. Ayres, The Theorx of Economic Progress, (1944; rpt. New Yorka
Schocken Books, 1962), p. 101..
·· .
·
13Ayres, Messiah, P• 122.

c.

14Ibid.

-

--
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"What is not obvious though it is incalcuably important, is the effect of
change.

That effect is mental."l5

=

~----

As has been stated before, Ayres admitted in his last published
writing

16

.

that he had failed to enumerate these two aspects of man, his

technological industry and his institutional aggrandizement, until he wrote
his article, "The Gospel of Technolo _," to be included in American
Philosophy Toda:y and Tomorrow, edited by Horace M. Kallen and Sidney Hook.
This article was published in 1935.

In this article he indicated that the

human animal was a problem-solving animal with a dedication to "workmanship,''
that is, tool-development, and he was also the creator of a never-ending
production of myths and ceremonies to brace his innumerable insecurities
with certainties.
st~~dards

in

to!£

In this article, he stated,

11

I have denounced institutional

as superstitious and debased and have advanced instead the

materialist-instrumentalist standard because the two are absolutely ·
17
opposed.''

The plan fo1• this chapter is to deal primarily
of human nature.

with Ayres's understanding

However, it is impossible to separate this basic dichotomy

that Ayres used to describe man's nature from the discussion of his
understanding of the "self."

It is the intention of the writer, though,

to deal more fully with Ayres's basic dichotomy of man's activities in.
Chapter Three•

16Ib· .d

.2..4• pp. iii-xii •

1

7Ayres, ~os~l, p. 4o.

)---·--~--------
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. It is clear that Ayres struggled with "three selves" in man, even
though man was an essential unity.

There are clearly levels of abstraction

in his thought, but he consistently looked upon man as a unity.

The three

"basic selves" he identified were "the biological self," "the social self,"
and "the SYJnbolic or cultural self."

It is only in his later works that

he came to a significant understanding of the "SYJnbolic or culturual self."
This understanding may have been concomitant with the same interests of
anthropologists of the period, especially Alfred L. Kroeber, one of the
greatest anthropologists America had yet produced.
to be "super-organic."

He did not mean by this that culture created itself,

It was man-made, or course.
any one .man•

Kroeber believed culture

But it had an extension beyond the life-span of

It had a partial existence tvhich was of its own character, but,

it was also obviously directly related to man.

Kroeber stated:

"Superorganic" does not mean nonorganic, or free of organic··
influence and causation; nor does it mean that culture is an
entity independent of organic life in the sense that some
theologians might assert that there is a soul which is or can
become independent of the living body. "Superorganic" means
simply that when we consider culture we are dealing with
something that is orgaJ}ic but.which must also be viewed as
something more than organic if it is to be fully intelligible
to us.18
·
However, Ayres did not indicate how this change evolved.
of "dichotomy," it may have been incohate for some period.

As his understanding
He may have

gained insight from Goldschmidt, Mills, Parsons, and it is possible, thou!!h
perhaps less likely, that he knew of the
perhaps George Murdock.

writin~s

of Leslie White and

At least Ayres was firmly convinced of the life-

18Alfred L. Kroeber, ~thropolo_a& Culture Patterns and Processes,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1923)~ p. 617-

~--~;~~=
..... -·----·
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process as "ongoing" and an extension of man's symbolic activity.

1

9

The Biological Self

n ----·-·----~---

The major interest of Ayres in his early period, circa 1925-1940,
centered upon evolutionary and technological change,

As noted above, Ayres

was both a materialist and a behaviorist; therefore he was

attemptin~

to

discover how technological activity (man's tools and machines) changed man

and why "Darwinism" was more comprehensive in theory than Charles Darwin's
. Origin of the Species.

The natur.e of man was more than an evolved organism,

and more than an acquired biological self, · To be sure

~o

saniens was a

part of nature, irrevocably so, but this was not the be all and end all.
His biological status was essential to his becoming man, but there was
another ingredient 'Which coexisted with his natural endowment and that was
his social development.
Darwin was certainly right in

~Aintaining

that man could not have

arrived except through a process of mutation, seiection, adaptation, and
. species orientation, but Ayres was seeking the main "triggering mechanism"
soc~al

. to man's total
written in

1932

change,

Ayres saw clearly in his biography of Huxley

what the essential ingredient must be:

it was the social

·activity of man that raised him to the level of "superape."

First, Darwin

was not the author of "Darwinism" or the originator of evolutionary
development.

It had its roots as far back as Greek

philosophy~··

Darwin's

"unique scientific contribution to evolutionary theory was a series of
formulas, natural selection, pangenesis, sexual selection and so on by

------

19see C. E. Ayres, !2;.·m.rd A Reason..~.bl.~ §.SH!iet;y:, (Austin, Texas:
University of Texas Press, 19b1), pp. 31-35.

2.5
20
which he sought to resolve the enigma of how development takes place.".
Secondly, he thinks that Huxley may be as much the author of "DarWinism" as
.

~------c--

Charles Darwin, ~nd stated, "In particular, I believe that Huxley 'created'
---------------~---

the theory of human descent from anthropoid stock as definitely as any man
ever creates anything." 21

Thirdly, the basis on which he could make this

statement was, he was sure, that Huxley saw the social connections of man's
evolvement in a singularly distinctive sense and that Charles Darwin did
nota
I think a detailed comparison of Darwin's and Huxley's published
works would indicate very clearly that Darwin's interest focused
from first to last upon the biological mechanisms by virtue of ·
which development takes place, whereas Huxley's interest from first.
to last was focused upon man, man's relation to the anthropoids
and the significance of that relationship for the integration of
all things human. As everyone knows, ~ Origin of the Species
mentions the hum.an species only o~ze and then on the penultimate
page and with complete vagueness.

What Darwin did was to stop short in his inquiry as to what made man
human.

He was content to rest his case with natural ascent and descent.

Huxley, on the other hand, rested his case on social ascenta
"What is it," he said, "that constitutes and makes man what
he .is? What is it but his power of language which distin~ishes
man from the whole of the brute world? I say that this functional
difference is vast, unfathomable, and truly infinite in its
consequences; and I say at the same time, that it may depend
upon structural differences which shall be absolutely inappreciable
to us without present means of investigation • • • • But a race
of dumb men, deprived of all communication with those who could
speak, would be little indeed removed from brutes. And the moral
and intellectual difference between them and ourselves would be
practically infinite though the naturalist should not be able ~o
2 .
f~nda single shadow of even specific structural difference."

20
Ayres,

-

24" Ib~d.
.

t

p. 2)5.

P• 2) 6 o

2
3Ayres, ~~ey, pp. 240-241.

26
.Here Ayres sounds very much like Benjamin Lee Whorf, who believes that
language actually "constructs" reality by conditionin€!' the very social
messages that are "coded" into culture. 24

:s

~---

~---

n --·----- -----~---

For Ayres, Huxley was the author of "Darwinism" and the interpreter of
the theory of evolution because he understood the implications of social
processes, processes in which man makes his own meanings and works out his
own problems through language.

It was only later, and gradually at that,

that Ayres was to. see fully the meaning of culture and the symbolic process,
however.
The Social Self ··
In "The Gospel of Technology," Ayres labored to indicate his "behavioristic" approach to hUlTlan development.

He was not limiting himself, he stated,

to schools of psychological orientation but was
important ways.

extend:tn~

the concept in

He was cognizant that even among social scientists a

wider definition was sought.

It was not only biological behaviorism that

he sought to identify but social behaviorism as

well~

But he recognized

full well that "behaviorism represents the whole trend of modern psychology,
which has been without any important exception toward the correlation of
behavior mechanisms with the organic structures on one side and the culture
traits of civilization on the other. "

25 The mystery of the self is thus

demystified and denaturalized when both biological development and social
development coexist&
24
.
Benjamin Lee Whorf, ~anguage, Thought, and Reality, (New York:
194o) t .£?:SSim.
25
Ayres, Gos~l, p. )4. :

Wiley,

27
How important this synthesis is we can easily demonst~ate
by an experimental dissociation. If we imagine the study of
all.the ·organic functions of the human body to have been
brought to its present pitch·or higher by men totally ignorant
of civilization's past and even present., it is obvious that
they would be quite unable to account for human behavior
·mechanisms; and if we imagine a very full and complete stock
of anthropological lore to have been accumulated by men
wholly uninformed in anatomy and physiolo~, it is equally
obvious that they would be at a complete loss to account for
the continuity of the behavior patterns so completelyrecorded
%-----------c--~by-trrEfil·-dat~Botn man anacJ.viTization are intelligible
only when the two are regarded as obverse and reverse of the .
same phenomenon. Z6 ·
.
. .

n
~·---

-------

~--~~--------~~----

:i
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Yet Ayres was not nearly as clear in these assessments as was to be
the case in his later writings.

(1944) and The Industrial

In both The Theory of Economic Progress

Econo~

(1952), he was to bring his reasoning

about the social self into sharper focus, and finally in Toward!. Reasonable
£.ociety, to re.ach what this writer considers to be a remarkable synthesis,
a representative sociological-anthropological synthesis, one that parallels
'27
the social thought of George Herbert Mead and the anthropological
28
thought of Leslie A. White.
Ayres in· his earlier writings had stated, "The weakness of evolution
in Darwin's time--and· this is still its

weak:ness~-was

the absence of any

.

sound clue to the forces which bring about modifications of the species."
He had in the beginning

a

29

rather incomplete notion as to the place of society

26Ibid., P• )4.
27
see George Herbert Mead, On Social Psycholcif:, ed. Anselm Strauss,
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956~
28Leslie A. White, The Evolution of Culture, (Ne~ York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1959); Th~ SCience of Culture, (New Yorkt Grove Press, Inc,, 1949).

29

Ayres, Theor.z, p. 93.

---------------

as the engine of change
vis.! vis "civilization," i.e., "culture."
But he
.
.
.

§

--

~

had a much clearer notion of technology, industrial forces, and the

-

- --

-

~-·-

;:,;,:

"workmanship of civilization" as the sources of change,

He knew that

· significant changes occurred with the development of tools and the
industrial revolution,· But as would be evident in his later works, after

194o, he began to see what

~e~

had anticipated, that is,

ho~1

both man's

tools and his cultural creations served as. the agents of change, together
and originally.

One must surmise that his continued interest in Veblen,

Dewey, anthropology, sociology, psychology~
·.economics and history brought
.
.

.

-

this fusion into greater perspective •.
Iri Ayres's middle writings,
The
.·
-~

Theorx_ of Economic

.

Pro~n"ess

.

and The Industrial

Economy.~

he maintaj.ned that

man was "wholly organic and wholly social. "30 Ayres never deviated from
his recognition that man was a social product, but his understanding of
. cultural and social meanings were now emerging into clearer focus,
Ayres showed a familiarity

wi~~

the writings of Charles Horton Cooley

and quoted Cooley's social theory that.no.person can exist separate from
other persons,3 1 It is a peculiarity in Ayres's development that he often
fails to explain the social theories of .other contributing scholars in
detail.

Here he failed to go ahead and enumerate Cooley's theory of the

theory of the "Looking Glass Self."

'I'his theory would have comported well

with his emphasis upon the social self.
30

Ayres, Theory, P•. 93.

. 31 Ayres, Theory, p. 91.

The concept of the self, according

..

29
to Cooley, is one that one builds with the help of others,32 There a~e
three steps to Cooley's conceptualization of this "social self."

F~st§

~--------------

-~
~----

F

_.

-

]=~---

our perception of how we look to others; second, our perception of their
judgments as to how we look; and third, our feelings about these judgments •.
It would have seemed pertinent for Ayres to have quoted Cooley more

extensively on this aspect of the self, but he seems to have been far more
interested in merely establishing the social relationship than exploring
it fully.
At this point, circa 1944, Ayres 1 s interest seemed to have turned
more to an analysis of cultural factors involved in the making of the
"self," rather than interpersonal factors.
in

He. now conceived of culture

much the same manner as A. L. Kroeber and his emphasis upon the

"superorganic" nature of culture. 33 He stated, much the same way as
Kroebez;that culture was "the organized corpus of behavior of which
economic activity is but a part, is a phenomenon sui

It is not

~eneris,

an epiphenomenon, a result of something else, explicable in other and non~

.

cultuzoal terms,"
nature,

.

.

.

.

Ayres had come to see culture as extrasomatic in its

But it is in Toward

! Reasonable Society that he emphasized the

.. symbolic self" in this process.

There he made explicit that human

development was possible only b,y man's use of symbols.

Indeed, in this

work he showed that man and culture emerged together through the symbolic

32c. H. Cooley, Human NatUre and the Social Order (New York:
Scribner's Sons, 1902):-pp, 102-1037--33A. L. Kroeber, pp, 60-73.

34Ayres, .Theory, p. 95.

Charles

"

'....:-~----

30
process, symbolic tool-activity and extrasomaticextension ofthis activity,35
Before moving to this emphasis upon the symbolic process,

however~

=-

Ayres

---

~-----

R

-

~~~~:--:====~---

stressed the "social framework" as the agent of change in a new dimension.
In The Industrial Economy (1952) Ayres stated that the "whole conception
of the nature of man and of society is now known to pe quite false.

Human

nature as we know it is not antecedent to ~ociety, On the contrary, it:
6
is a function of societ~ ... 3 He indicatedsocial conditioning in even
stronger termsi

"It is a truth now recognized by all students of all social

sciences and as fully established. as any i~tellectual principle can be, that
in the absence of organized society. there could not exist any such being as
/

man,

That man and society evolved together; and that human nature is a

social phenomenon not a biological one."37
In Toward !. Reasonable Society, Ayres sounded remarkably similar to

George Herbert Mead, whose theori.es of human interactionism may have been
familiar to him,38 although he does not make an exter1sive association clear.
As previously noted, this was one of the weaknesses of JW:res's writing.
did not document extensively.

Perhaps he thought that it was too

·"ceremonial" to stoop to such elaboration.

But Ayres started to use the

"symbolic imagery" in a new way, and he musthave derived this

35

He

11

concept"

.

Ayres, Societx, pp. 71-86.

36c. E.·Ayres, The Industrial Economy (Boston: Houghton-M'lfflin, 1952),
P• 11 •.

37Ibid.
38Ayres, Theor_x, p. 163, n. 6.
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from other sources,

Mead had said, "thinking always takes place by means

~------::_---=------

~-

of somesort of symbols,"39 and symbols were seen to be universals, that is,

<=:~~~~~==~~~=

recognized without additional elaboration.
in Toward.!: Reasonable Society.

Mead.believed, as is well known, that human

nature was a process and not an entity.
self.

This is the emphasis Ayres used

He did not make a "thing" of the

Therefore, the social process for Mead was positive, quite the

reverse of Sigmund Freud's "superego,'' which inhibited; curbed, or censored
spOntaneity.

He saw the cooperative aspects of man's interaction, the

"rne" or the outside and objective world making the "I" or inward and
spontaneous part of the self possible.

But the individual was in essence

social, since both the objective world and the subjective "I" interact to
form the self.

Still, the self was never static; it changed as new

situations and new experiences occurred.
the.self in process.

Mead asserted:

Mead's concept of the self was

"No hard-and-fast line can be drawn

between our own selves and the selves of others, since our own selves exist
.
40
and enter as such into our experience....
So, the "I" really appears
41
·experientially as a part of.the "me."
Thus :Head was.dealing with social behavior on one level of abstraction
in the same sense that Ayres was developing his social theory along at least
two lines of abstraction.

Ayres was wrestling not only with the dichotomous

nature of man as to "industry" and "myth-making" but also as to the dichotomous
nature of "symbols" and "culture" as ~utside entities and yet within man as
symbolic tool-activity.

39Mead, p. 210.
40~ap P• 227e
41
Thid., P• 31.
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Mead did not show a great interest in cultural development;
more interested in the

s~cial

I1e was

psychology of the self or the psychological
~----

~

understanding of ·the self in process, not culture as an extrasomatic

,:r=::~==
ri
;-;-~----

extension of man's activities.

He knew that selves were created by a process

of socialization that included culture, but he did not clearly set forth a
theory of culture,

This is not to say, however, that he did not see society

as the creator of customs, mores, and institutions.

He was certainly fully

aware.of institutions and society and their place in human development.
But Mead did not pursue a theory of technological behavio~ as a part of the
.
. ·42
human process; as a part, that is, of the engine of change.
Ayres, then, arrived at the same socialization theory as Mead yet with
even broader implications,

He was from the very beginning of his writings

intet-ested in both the input of society and the creative "workmanship" of
man.

Later he was willing to designate

culture a:s one of the basic elements

in this change and to view it far differently than "civilization" that he had
used·in his earlier writings.

He came to use the concept in the sense of

"the whole way of life of a people" and "the extension of their symbols and
artifacts'' beyond the lifetime of a people.

He stated&

Every human being becomes human in the behavioral sense only
by assimilating such a body of action patterns, At birth he
is human only in the zoological sense, His body is that of a
member of our species; but he is utterly incapable of behaving
as all human beings do (for instance, he is utterly unable to
communicate langaugewise) until he has learned a set of action
patterns by virtue of which he is able to participate in the
activities of a cammunity among whom that set of action patterns
already pl'evails. 3
42

ill,£. t pp. 249-282.

4

3Ayres,

~oc~, pp.

?1-1-...75.

JJ

And he elaborated, that the more strongly we absorb the "social mean:i.ngs and

------------

~

s_

symbols;" the more sure we are that this is our active self. 44
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The difference between Mead's concept of socialization and that of
Ayres lies in the part tool-behavior played in human development.

For Head,

socialization was symbolic, interpersonal interaction, but for Ayres, it was
social tool-behaviors

"A prime characteristic of the symbolic process is
4
its indefinite extensibility." .5 Tool behavior or the symbolic process
was both ongoing and iinmediate; it used the past as an engine.of change and
built.upon it.

It created anew to Solve whatever problems became important:

"So likewise tools and instruments and all the physical apparatus of·
culturally organized existence, being physical, accumulate and since new·
and improved tools and apparatus result from combining and refining.of old
ones, the more there are the greater is the opportunity for still further
46
development."
The Symbolic

~

It may seem at first glance that there is only

a superficial difference

between the terminology of a social self in the thought of Ayres and that
of a symbolic self, but this concept became the central delineation of
meaning which Ayres used to define technological behavior,

A tool for Ayres

meant any symbol or artifact that, whenever used in a prescribed manner,
has the same observable effect,
44
Ibid. t p. .56.

45 Ib"d

.2-•t P• 92 •
46Ibid.,

P• 93.

Ayres stateda

"Human thought, like human

"'

34
activity, presents two aspects.

In one of these man reasons toolwise from

cause to effect, and the.product of his reasoning is knowledge, however

R.
--"'------c-:-:=
Q=~

limited, of the tiniformities of nature.

Thus rubbing of a bronze lamp

-.

'""
r;
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invariably removes the tarnish and produces a high polish, no matter who
does it, and no matter what the concomitant circumstances may be. u 47 V.lhat
makes his concept of symbolism more difficult to understand is that he
juxtaposes the

11

symbolic process" alongside the "cultural process."

Ayres
;:

reasoned a
What most needs to be stressed in this connection is that
technology--the tool-using aspect of human behavior--is not
something separate and distinct from the societal network 9f
personal relationships~ It permeates all such relationships.
This is a point of the utmost importance • • • The most serious
error one can make with regard to human experience, society,
culture, and all related matters is that of thinking of
technology as "external," outside us, as aspect of the physical
envil'onment of individual men and even of societies. In truth
it is none of these things. All tool-using is social. What
Adam Smith called "the division of- labor" as defined and required
by tools--required not in the sense of the exercise of arbitrary
authority but in the sense that the job in hand can be done only
by four or more hands working together, hands wnach in the nature
of the case must belong to two or more persons.
•
At times Ayres used culttire to indicate the symbolic tool process as above,
.
.
49
.
at times he used culture to indicate the institutional processr
and at
times he used culture to indicate the extension of man's artifacts and
concepts or symbols, in an extrasomatic sense.5°

47Ib·d
l. , , P• -129.
48

~

..

PP• 77-78.

49Ibid., PP• 126-127.
50Ibid., P• 75.
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Ayres thought of culture along two lines of abstraction, the extrasomatio

~------

-q

----------

character of physical tools and symbols that have extensibi1ity, and also the
F

=o-~~~

social process by which culture is absorbed and created.

The "symbolic

process" is a part of man and survives man in an extrasomatic form.

Symbols

were both material and non-material, that is, artifacts and concepts embodied
in culture.

~yres

stated:

The study of primitive cultures by which all our social thinking
has been so profoundly affected, involved two distinct orders of
. data. One .consists of physical objects 1 the tools, weapons,
accouterments, charms, fetishes, ikons, and all the other
physical apparatus of life in any given community; and the other
consists of all the rest of culture of that community. The
former is called the comml,W.ity's material culture and the latter
its non-material culture.) 1
·
vlhat is intriguing about the concept of culture as presented by Ayres
is the juxtaposing of symbolic behavior alongside cultural behavior.

He

believed that conceptual tools were as functional in the progress of man
as were his physical artifacts and they bore a contextual relationship.
Ayres stated:

"Social theorists have sometimes pondered the question

which came first, culture or society. -But as knowledge accumulates this
seems more clearly to be a hen-and-egg conundrum.

Clearly culture, defined

as a body of activity patterns and society, defined as an organized
community, are aspects of the same phenomenon.

The creation of interpersonal

relationships is a function of culture. •i,;2
As has been previously stated, Ayres was by no means the first to
indicate that technology is the prime agent in moving man toward change.
The writer who appears to come closest to Ayres's understanding of man is

51 Ibid., p. 78.
52Ib.d

--~-·,

pp. 75-76.

Leslie A. White.

There is every indication that Ayres worked independently

and White does not give Ayres credit for his thought.

White believes that

~
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---
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man has two main·aspects in his make-up:

Technology or tool-making and his

social side. White believes that man and culture arrived together, because
man could do what no other animal could, namely, "symbolize."
him different

.H'!

This makes

kind and not in degree• as Darwin had believed, from all

other.animals.

Man must create physical tools as these are essential to

his security.

For White, though, the physical tools are the basis of his

symbolizing.

Therefore, physical tools not

o~~Y

they are dominant in his social arrangements.
two types of needs:

11

(

provide

~an,

~An

with security,

according to White, has

1) those that can be served only by exploi t.ing the

resources of the external world; and (2) those that can be served by drawing
upon .the resources of. the human organism only." ~ Man has two types of
security.needs, one physical, and one "spiritual" or "interorganismal."
But White consistently maintains that it is man's physical tools that
dominate his social meanings.

For White, the social behavior of man, the

sentimental and attitudinal nature of man, and the ideological or philosophical
production of man result directly from symboling based upon his physical
tools.

The technological factor is the basic one; all others are
dependent upon it."54 In this sense White becomes a technological determinist,
11

since man is incapable of "con.ceptualizine:" beyond what his technology
allows.

5~i te, Evol~ion, p. 9.

54Ibi~. •

p. 19.
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There is, therefore, a fundamental difference between Ayres and White,
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despite s.triking similarities.

For Ayres, the symbol is a tool in itself, ·

"'
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a normative instrument, just as the physical tool is a proven instrument,
of cqange.

i'
~

------

But for lfuite the symbol is a reflection on man's physical tools,

which is a part of his brain direction.
material creations dictate.

Man

ca~~ot

move beyond what his

White makes this causal relationshi

_e_xp.,..l,_..i...,c'"'i._.,t.___~-----'---. ____

in this statement:
If it be argued that technologies could not exist without
ideas--and it is of course a matter of empirical observation
that technologies do not exist apart from ideas--and that
therefore tools are dependent upon ideas, it may be countered,
first, that ideas can be significant and effective in the
maintenance of life only by receiving expression through ·
technological means, and hence are dependent upon them,
whereas the technological culture is significant directly.
Secondly, in associations of technologies and ideas, one can
account for idea systems in terms of technologies, and technologies can be explained in terms of the physico-chemical,
mechanical means of adjustment of one material body to
.
another. But if one explains technologies in terms of ideas,
the ideas are either unexplained or are accountedfor b5
appeal to other ideas, which amounts to the same thing. 5 .
Ayres used "technology" in a vastly different sense to White, for he
understood physical tools anq symbolic tools to be reciprocial:
But in fact we have no warrant for supposing that ideas
are more real than things. If we approach the problem of
reality in the full light of our knowled~e of the symbolic
process, it becomes quite clear that the reality of ideasymbols, though genuine, is in no sense superior to that of
things. Symbols are a different order of reality from things,
but not a "higher" order. If precepts without concepts are
meaningless, it is likewise true that concepts without precepts
are blind--which is only Kant's way of saying that symbols
could not exist Without things any more than man could make
use of things without symbols. In short, there is only one
form of knowledge, the knowledge man has.acquired in the
course of his technological activities, activities in which·
things and symbols are fruitfully combined. Apart from

.
56
. . t.1.es, symb o1 s 1 ead only t o 1."11.us1.on,
th ose ac·t l.Vl.
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It is diccicult to summarize Ayres's thought on these points relating
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to the "symbolic or cultural" self.
in the levels of abstraction used.

There ia a great amount of ambiguity.

~~--------

Perhaps this must be, as the ideas

dealt with have a complexity recognized by other writers. 57 It is not
difficult to understand where the problem lies.

The difficulty is iri

l--------------~------------'---'~~~-~----.--

presenting a comprehensive view of symboling, culture, society, technology,
and .tool-behavior. ·A:/res revealed this frustration in a very telling
sentence:

"As I have been saying repeatedly, what we sometimes call

'human nature, • sometimes 'society, • and sometimes •culture, • has two ·
contrasting aspects.

This is no new insight.

Throughout the ages ·

·thoughtful men have pictured the human race as drawn one way by white
horses and another by black. 11 58

The difficulty is that these terms indeed

seem to have a basic relationship in Ayres's thought, but they also stand
apart and carry other meanings.

Ayres might have gone on to state that

no matter how comprehensive the theory, the process being described seems
to be

lim~ted

by its paramount complexity, but he did not.

The problems Ayres sought to answer are simple enough to enumerate:
How is culture an internal entity and how is culture extrasomatic? What is
symboling and how is it a part of the human self? HovT is tool-behavior
represented both by the creation of physical instruments and by conceptual

56Ayres, Societ;y, P• 107 •
.57Howard Becker and Alvin Boskoff, Modern Sociolo&ical 1~eo~; (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and vJinston, 19.57), p. 296,
.
58Ayres, Societ_Y-, p.

76.
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tooJ.s?

Are interpersonal relations or human interactions necessary t.o a

f---;::: ___________ _

~

~

tool-complex? How does the individual function as beth a se1f ·and a
corporate part of society? What term can you use to sum up this whole
process of material and non-Dlaterial production on the part of man?
The term Ayres used to

sum

up the whole human process was

"technology," but he knew the parts in the puzzle to be "human nature,"
"society," and "culture." Man was human by virtue of his ability to use
symbols , by which Ayres meant more than the creation of physical tools;
the non-material and; normative symbol itself was surely a tool.
tools are not used in isolation; they are socially conceived.

Symbolic
The

"symbolic self" is, in Ayres's social thought, it seems, indisputably·
related to the "social self," but includes much more than a vast array
of interpersonal relationships.

The "symbolic self" includes man's

"technical skills" and his "interpersonal skills" in a contextual relationship.

The "symbolic self" is so extensive that it probably should be

described as the "cultural· self," which would include both man's "way of
life" and ... the extension of his life through technology."
Summarl
In presenting a summary of Ayres's thought concerning the human self,
several stages in his thought must be kept in mind.

He was convinced early

in his career that the distinctive change agents affecting man's self
were technology and social conditioning.

While these distinctions were

part of AvTes's early writing, he had just started to develop a social
theory based upon Veblen's "institutionalism" and Dewey's ''instrumentalism."

4o
The soc·ial theory that Ayres developed in these formative years placed .
.iJ __ _

emphasj.s upon man as a social creation and not fundamentally a biological
entity.

.;:;
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The biological self for Ayres was merely a "personal identity,"
was the constant while society was the variable,

It

He made this distinction

clearly in Toward !! Reasonable Society, where he stated, "But human
activities and experiences are always social and cultural, whereas
'personality' is individual."59 To talk about "biological man," as a
complete person was a misnomer, according to Ayres.

Certainly there is

a biological part to human nature, just as there is often a known chemical
basis to physical reality,

But biologically, man, while evidencing a

great variety, is essentially the same as he was fifty thousand years ago
in structural make-up: · His symbol-using ability has been expanded perhaps,
as I.

Q.

may expand throughout the species, but "the fact remains that

since the advent of·the present species, something like fifty thousand
years ago, there is no evidence of any change in the brain power of the
species generally."6o Ayres thus thought "concepts such as 'individualism,'
'freedom,' 'privacy,' and 'enterprise,' are not only vague; they are
tendentious and ambiguous."

61

personality changes as wall.

59Ayres Socie,tz, p. 118.
. '
6o Ibid.' P• 93.
61
.
Ayres, Theo::z, P• 89.

When the conditions of life change, the
There is no such quality as Human Nature

41
spelled in capital letters,

62

Ayres found in Thomas Huxley's understanding

of evolutionary theory the emphasis upon the

chart~Se

ag·ent that made man

-~----

~-----_
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human, as he stated, "Huxley was right, of course, in declaring that

--------

science(and we may add industrial technology) began_when man first began
to pick up sticks and stones and use themas tools." 63
In his later works Ayres began to expand his culturological th_e_or_l._·e_s__________
and to place them within his dichotomous framework.

He stated, "There is

no people and no individual to whom technological competence is not a
. genuine reality. " 64 There is a basic continuity in the symbolic or tool65
using process. It is ongoing because it is problem solving.
He affirmed,
"Tools are of all degrees of generality. · Thin.ldng itself is a tool
operation; for in the most general sense, the ideas with which men's heads
are furnished are intellectual tools.

How anybody goes about solving any

problems depends almost altogether upon what ideas (or concepts) which
are at our disposal that determine the form of the questions we ask."

66

·Ayres continued to develop two aspects of the self, the basic:dichotorny
of human enterprise, throughout his life.
social, functional, and

productive~

Technological behavior was

albeit never "absolute."

Institutional
behaviot- was irrational, non-productive, and basically wastefu1. 67 The
s-elf- was a complex that was socially conditioned and was tool-using in

62see discussion in Ayres, Society, p. 120. ·
63Ibid.' p. 92.

64.Ayres~ Theory, p. 159.
65Ibid.
66.kyres, Econol1}!, pp. 37-38.
67Ayres, Messiaht p. iv.
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nature.

Culture consisted of both physical tools and conceptual tools.

C:------------
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"Ceremonial tools" may take on a quasi-technological function, but they
were never the "real thing."

f;----
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The dynamic change-agent in man is his

.

.

"symbolic self," which undertakes to solve the basic problems of 1ife.

It

is this process that is or.going--a means-ends-means continuum.
Ayres's very complex theory about man's "selves" lll{t.kes his social •
theory attractive from a sociological viewpoint.

Many social scientists

have set forth various change-agents, psychological theories based upon
..

Freud, interactionist

theori~s

.

based upon Mead and Cooley, functionalist

theories based upon a social-institutional equilibrium, mechanistic and
behavioristic theories based upon organic causal factors, and technologicaleconomical theories basedupon.material dominance, but Ayres's social
thought is comprehensive in that it incorporates the aspects of the "self"
. into a contextual framework of "biological," "social," and "cultut•al,"
processes.
in

Ayres's theory stands in the mainstream of sociological theory

its emphasis upon social and cultural·components in man's development,
.

but it is unique in its emphasis of the two

.

aspec\~

in man, which Ayres

viewed as a dichotomous whole, tool-behavior and institutional behavior.
which will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter.

--

CHAPI'ER' THREE.

THE DICHOTOMY OF SOCIAL ACTION 1

TECHNOLOGICAL AND
~-------------
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INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS

The first step in Ayres's development of his dichotomy of social action
was taken in Science:

The False Messiah (1927).

As has been stated before,

he did not identify the dichotomy as such at this time.

process, if inchoately.

In Science1

But with the

The False Messiah, he did not intend

to depreciate the contribution of science to the ongoing life process, but
he did "demythologize" science conceived as merely a body of facts.

Science

was a process, that is, the science that Ayres considered to be worthy of
that title.

Reattempted to make this clear:

wnich science rests turn out to be machines.

" ••• the facts upon
In the beginning is a

machine--say, for example, the famous oil drop machine on which minute
·particles of oil of measurable size are sprayed into a vacuum and certain
1

'rays' are allowed to enter." · Thus, science for Ayres, was not fulfilled
in theory only but also in its application.

He agreed with John Dewey that

life is not merely the knowing but the doing, and so with science, while
it is represented in the knowing, it should be most interested in the
doing.

The two go together.

Ayres believed that science could be institutionalized and in that
sense be "theory" and not "technology," the problem solving aspect of the

1

claren~e E. Ayres, Science1 The False Messiah, (1927; rpt. Clifton,
N.J.z Augustus M. Kelley Publishers, 1973), p. 53.

2-----~
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dichotomy.

But Ayres conceived of "institution" in a very specific sense,
;:'!-

a broad sense.

The term "institution" did not represent merely social or·

formal organizations but also functional categories.

8-.___, _ _ __
;:,::

-- --
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He stated:

" -------·
-

. That is, it does not refer merely to the division of the total
substance of society into its constituent parts. It is, rather
a functional category. As such it has reference to a certain
type of social organization or a certain aspect of social
behavior, which is qualitatively different from another aspect,

1~------~--------'-!'-e.s-pee-tsc,-one-:in-wl'l.'ieh:_cl.4-:f-f'erent-force-s-are-at-work-t-o~~~-----------c-----c:-.

different effect from those to be observed in other aspect, or
aspects of social organization.
·
·

There is nothing difficult or subtle about this functional
distinction. If we proceed directly to the analysis of what
we will regard as "typical" institutions all possess it in the
same degree as they possess the quality of institutions.
One peculiar feature which the "typicai" institutions all
seem to ··E:xhibit is that of the determination of authority.
They define the various ranks into which people are divided,
and the types and degrees of authority that are to be
exercised by ea~h and of subservience that is to be expected
. of each • , • •
·
Thus, science could be institutionalized in the sense of a final
authority but the technological process could not since it was experimental.
Science .could be institutionalized if it made its "lore" or "dogma" an
"entity" in itself and irretevant to the ongoing life process. Science,
the great hope for man, would then be truly the false
ridiculed its lofty dogmatic authority in these words:

~siah,

He

"In making their

case for. science, the modern prophets appeal directly to our credulity
precisely as Moses did."

3 What Ayres intended to imply is found in the

2C. E.. Ayres, The Industrial Economy (Boston:
PP• 42-43~

)Ayres, Messiah, p.

43.

Houghton-Yrl.fflin, 1952 ) 1
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old Biblical adage, ''By their works you shall know them."

It is not by

=

faith in a body of facts that the messiah colTies, meanirig the hun1an weJfare,
but by

n
)-----~-----

~

seemed contented to vi'ew science as a bodyof facts without connecting
their conclusions to the life process.

He.was well ,!lWare that scientists

must lead the way to change, for science ·cannot be mastered by the masses.
He·stated, "Science can not be the intellectual background .of the common
.

,·

.

.·

man, and never will be--barring the realization of.that Shavian dream of
a new race of man who will have the. remarkable faculty of passing on the
. .
4
higher mathematics to their progeny like a family resemblance."
The
scientist had an obligation, that is, to be cognizant of the many areas
of life affected by his work and to set forth by demonstration new paths
for human progress.

·-

~~-===

demonstration~

Ayres was perturbed that scientists during the period of the 1920s

.

-

~----------
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The tremendous developments that are freeing men from

old "myths" are not just scientific formulas but·actual technological
improvements:
But this is. only the logical aspect of the case. There is
also the dramatic. Tremendous changes have come to pass in
the last few·centuries. We have solved many problems; and
each solution has left us with a new technique, so that we
seem to be better equipped for solving others with each
century and decade. Not only has the chariot of progress
come thundering down the ages; equipped with the sleeve~
valva engine and the counterbalanced crank-shaft, it is now
:;;~_3tionless at the hig~est speeds, as the advertisement~
Even with its enviable position, then, science must play second fiddle
to the true messiah, the innovation of machines, or tools, skills, technology,

4Thid., p. 32.
5Ibid. ' pp. 206-207.
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or civilization (later to be identified with "culture" but "civilization"
was the fashionable term at this period).· He maint.ainQd., ••science is the
handsome Doctor Jekyll; machinery is Hr. Hyde--powerful and rather sinister.

~----=--------_
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· Science is the Pentateuch of technology-.;.what we have been given to believe
.
6
by your new machine-made folkways."
Science as fact and theory is not the
engine of change.

Scientists who admire their new-found status should

realize •• • • • that the driving force behind science is machine technology
.

.

and they would have understood that maclune technology as a whole, and not
mereiy the verbal promulgations of scientists, is responsible for the
disloca ti.ons of European culture. " 7
I

Later Ayres realized. that science was changing, and he began to see it
in a new sense.

He was always convinced that it was the "thinking" part of

the "technological" process, and he was fond of using Dewey's description
of the relationships
• • • borrowing a figure of speech from John Dewey, I have
been identifying science as the "thinking" .aspect of the
tool-using process and technology as the "doing" aspect of
the same process. Neither :ls possible or conceivable except
as an aspect of the other. Science advances through and.with
the advancement of the relevant apparatus (including the
appa1•atus of. mathematics) and vice. versa.
·
So conceived, science is irrelevant to the whole universeof-discourse of messiahship, and vice versa, But in common
discourse in all languages we employ the term "science" to
identify not only what scientists (or would be scientists,
or quasi-scientists, or mock-scientists) do, also what they
~--with whatever degree of professional authority or
.
intellectual justification. It was, of course, th:is ·aspect
of "science" whose supposed "messiahship" I was discussin~
in this book (Science: The False Messiah).· When I wrote,

6Ibid., p. 19.
7Ibid., p. 113.

as tho first "thesis to be nailed to the laboratory door":
'"i'hat the truth of science is established only by belief,
after the manner of all folk-lores," I was of course 8
charact~rizing the literature produced by scientists.
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Throughout this work Ayres made these central points over and over
again, almost ad infinitum.

He wrote in another work along the same train

of thought:
In tni--s-transformatl.on what we call science is a dynamic ~.
force not because. of "the power of the idea" but because
v1hat we call science is one aspect of a much ~:Teater and
more potent social force: Technology. The rea.son we have
always found it so difficult to define science satisfactorily
is that we have taken it out of its cultura1 sett,inp:, made it
an academic abstraction, and tried.to describe the essence of
what was in fact a fragment. Science is an activity of
handling materials with instruments. No line can be made to
lie between scientific instruments and any other kind of
machine or tool o:r workmanlike device except whether or not
the tool or instrument is used to work materials • • • • •
Science can of course be described as a state of mind, but only
as a state of mind of that activity: The material state of
mind, the instrumental state of mind.9
The true scientist is not i.YJterested in public acclaim, as Ayres
viewed him, but he is interested in
. demonstrating by continuous inquiry.
encased or entombed,

experimenting,~

finding out,

arid~

Facts are to be employed, not

Near the end of his

~life

Ayres believed that the

new science 1r1as written much niore appropriately and more in keeping 1rrith
the life process.

"vle are told that the cosmology (if such it bel) of

Planck, Einstein, Heisenber and their co-workers cannot be set forth in
language of the multitude,

It

is totally

ir~elevant

to the folk-lore of

8.f.?id., pp. vi-vii.
9clarence Edwin Ayres, 11 The Gospel of Technology," in Ameri~ PhiJ osophl
.1,9.dE;Y.: .~ld To~~ eds. Horace H. Kallen and s~_dney Hook (1935; rpt.
Freepor.t, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), p. 38.
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the past generation and vice ~~· .. io Ayres appreciated this proce$s-posture

~----~-=---

q

of the new science.

EssentiaDy then, Ayres wrote this earlier work as a

----------

'~
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protest against scientists who took themselves too seriously as revealers
of permanent truths.
In his later work, Holier Than Thou, Ayres looked upon "institutions"
as the resisting side of man's technology,

Institutions as Ayres conceived

them were more than material embodiments or social organizations--they were
attitudes, traditions, patterns of behavior, and established authorities,
They existed in the social framework of cultural activities just as surely
as did rocks or trees in nature or automobiles and houses in the physical
sense.

vJhat Ayr.es had learned from Veblen was that this dichotomy of human

activity, technological-instrumental and institutional-ceremonial, was a
part of the same matrix and not from different matrices.

So even though

these behavior functions can be separated conceptually for analytical
purposes, they can never be separated in their common cultural or social
matrix.

This is the meaning of dichotomy,

Veblen had seen these two

aspects of human activity clearly, although he more often talked about
"workmanship" and "ceremony," than "technology" and "institutional," but the
. meaning was inescapable,

On "institutional behavior,'' Veblen wrote:

Like all human culture this material civilization is a
scheme of institutions--institutional fabric and institutional
grov.-th, But institutions are an outgrowth of habit, The
grovTth of culture is cuniulative sequence of habituation, and
the ways and means of it are the habitual response of human

10Ayres, Messiah, P• viii,

"
----~-

nature to exigencies that vary incontinently, cumulatively,
but with something of a consistent sequence in the cumulative
variations that go forward , , •11
Ayres was convinced early in his career that Veblen's "Insti tutio11.alism"
represented one side of social behavior.

He

,.. _ __

n
..-------~-

wrote:

·.What chiefly determines a man's attitude toward alterations
in the mores is the point at which the social shoe abrades his
foot. Unhappy couples are more tolerant of divorce than happy
!----~--·one-s~Y-e~~g-~eepla-a-re-mor-e_:_to-l-er-rult-of~co~ntr-a-c-e-ptJ:-on-tlran-9--ld'--------'-;-------c

people and the professional celibates. Women are more sensitive . .
to feminism than .men. But most especially, the rich, the powerfult·
and the successful and even the merely hopeful are vastly more
concerned to maintain the status quo thim the poor, the helpless
and those without hope as things stand· at present, We sometimes
hear the complaint against socialists and communists that they
are ill-considered men, gauche, greasy and guttural. But what
do we expect to find social revolutionaries, suave cultured,
delicately scented men, with oxford accent and ultra-ritzy
man."'lers? 'rhe poor too, , enjoy their caricatures, They see the
conservative always as a paunchy man, grossly over-fed, overdecorated, under-exercised,12
Ayres believed that the institutional ways of behavior made sense to
participants even if they were irrational to others.

Habit reinforced

positions in the same sense that symbolization created them.
Ayres

h~ld

\<lith Veblen,

that "an institution is of the nature of a usage which has

1
become axiomatic
.
. and indispensable by habituation
.
. and general acceptance." 3
.

Veblen said in another instances
, , • an institution is an historical growth with just as much
of a character of permanence and continuity of transmission as
is. given it by circumstances out of which it is grown. Any
institution is a product of habit, or perhaps more accurately
11

.
Thorstein Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization (;New Yorka
The Viking Press, 1919)-;-pp. 240-241.
- --12clarence E, Ayres, Holier Than Thou, (1929; rpt. Clifton,. N. J. 1
Augustus 1-1. Kelley Publishers, 1973), pp. 223-224,
13Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownershiu ~nd ~usiness Ente!£ris~ in Recent
'rime~ {New York: R. H. Euebach, Inc., 1923), p. 101 n,
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is abody of habits of thought bearing on a given line of
conduct, which prevails with such generality and uniformity
througfzut the group as to have become a matter of common
sense.
.
.

;,
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Ayres was convinced as well about the control of "institutional habit":

·''

In the main, the control of morality is secure. Social
emulation is stronger than the division of the classes. It
arises from the very character of human herd behavior. In .
our domesticated life we proceed by habit and tradition,
that
~~~~---~~----------------.
1---------:------;is, by dol.ng as otliers do; and-in spi~e of slight
risks here·
and there, we are a civilization by virtue of that inner
necessity which impels us all to look in the sap5 direction•- .
the successful condition--of all righteousness.
. .
As Ayres developed his theory of value, he became more and more
convinced that "institutional behavior" was debilitating and·wasteful, a
position he was to soften somewhat in time.

Perhaps he realized it was

alm·:>st as irreversible in its strength as technology was in motivating
change.

But this woQld be to nullify his central theme that

te~;nology

brings change by overturning the inadequate institutional patterns of
behavior.

This was Ayres's thesis of human. progress which will.be dealt

with in ·chapter Four.

One of,Ayres's most caustic statements about

institutional behavior is the following:

"The whole scheme

o~

power-

relationships which we call institutions and usually mistake for civilization
is savage in origin, depraved in character, and false in thought."

16

But

when he wrote later, he had modified his harshness and had come to accept
.

.

some aspects of ceremonial or institutional behavior:
The point is tha.t ceremonial values do not exist in isolation, ·
Always they constitute a system. That system is a quasi-causal

14Thorstein Veblen,· An Inquig Into the Nature of Peace and !:!'1! Terms
of its F~etpetuation (New York: The Hacmillan Co., 19~ p. 91.

15Ayres, Holier, p. 178.
16 Ayres, Q_ospel, p. 32.
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system. In or~g1n it is an extrapolation of tool causality
and hence of uniformities of nature, of which it is a simulacrum.
Hence the validity of the ceremonial system cannot be asserted
without indirect assertion of the reality of the technological
process and the validity of technological values. When social
scientists assert that values derive solely ~rom the convictions
. of the peoples who adhere to them, 1hey are necessarily and
inevitably asserting the contrary, 1
Strassman commenting on this change says, "Another development in. Ayres's

ceremonial thought and behavior patterns.

In the 1940s he cursed. these as

pure humbug that allowed the strong to exploit the weak, and ·inefficiently
at that.

A decade or two later he came to see that the more numerous weak

fell for the trick only because ceremonialism was pseudo-technoiop::i.cal. •
• •

u18

Still, Ayres never conceded too much, for he was firmly convinced

tha.t ceremonialism could check technological growth and progress, but only
for a time, and that "institutional behavior" could never be more than a
simulation of technological-symbolic usage.

One of his final statements

clarified the issue a " • • , some symbolism has operational validity and
some does not; and if we firmly recognize this basic truth, the relationship.
between the two orders of simbols then becomes unmistakably clear and the
enigma resolved," 19
Basically, Ayres maintained that institutional behavior was founded
upon tribal legends, upon theological beliefs, social statuses, ceremonial
inadequacies,

~ustoms,

and

sentj~ents.

Opposed to these were the rational

17c. E. Ayres, Toward a Reasonable Society (Austin, Texas: University
of Texas Press, 1961), pp: 133-134.
1
Paul Strassmann, "Technology: A Culture Trait, a Logical Category
or Virtue itself?" Journal of Economic Issues, VIII (December, 1974), p. 675,
19Ayres, Society, p. 31.
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elements of tool-behavior.

But ceremonial behavior is strongly resistant to

change, and it is greatly irrational.

Ayres remarked:

"However brilliant

a young scholar may be and however genuine his contributions to the sum of
hurnan·knowledge, the.fact that he has not 'taken his doctor's degree' is
accounted a blemish on his character." 20 The authority in insitutionalism
is vested in superordinates or shamans,

"In ceremonial investiture 'mana'

flows from the person of the chief, just as one 'takes courage' from
21
association with persons of superior courage."
So, "not only does·
ceremonial behavior determine status by the ritualistic transfer of mystic
potencies; it does so by virtue of a set of beliefs of which all.'ceremonial
adequacy' is an expression, or in which the \\thole power-system of status
and mores finds its supposed justification." 22
Ayres understood,in a progressively more comprehensive fashion that
the change-agent that could break down institutionalism was technology or
tool-behavior.

Ayres confirmed&

"A tool is an artifact which will perform

to much lhe srune effect whoever wields it, one that anybody can employ.
A fetish on the other hand, is wholly ineffective in any but consecrated

hands.

Profane hands may whirl the bullroarer in defiance of taboo and

may produce a noise; but that noise will not summon any spirits.

Only when

the bullroarer is whirled by persons of designated status will mystic
forces respond to its supplication," 23· The authority for technological

20c, E. Ayres, The Theory of Economic Progress ( 1944; rpt. New York a
Shocken Books, 196~ p •. 1.57.

21 Ibid.' PP• 16.5;..166.
22Ib.d
--2:._·, P• 170.
23

~'es, SocietY., p. 13.5.
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beha,~or

is reason, but the authority for ceremonial behavior is force.

Wheelis, noting this distinction, comments:
values seldom invoke violence.

"Clashes between instrumental

Wheelbarrows are alleged better than hand-

barrows, but never has a debate over this issue led to bloodshed. " 24 Why
not?

It is simply that when a tool proves more effective, it is used, and

those who hold out for the old are allowed to go their own way.

But as

Wheelis points out, if the old way were to be institutionalized, that is
foroedupon others by an outside authority, then the result could very well
bring hostile or violent repercussions.

This would be a clash, not over
instrumental values, but the authority of institutional values. 25
The instrumental or technological process is tool-using, experimental,
temporal, secular, matter-of-fact, and functional.

Tools go beyond just

the life.span of individuals; they have an endless extensibility.

Therefore,

they can be combined in an endless number of "inventions" and "possibilities ... 26
Ayres did not point·out clearly, however, as others have, namely, Leslie A.
White and Fred Cottrell, the place of energy and its usage in this
progression. 27 Both of these writers made explicit that surplus energy was
essential in the multiplication of physical tools.

Cottrell defined surplus

energy as "the energy available to man in excess of that expended to make

24Allen vlheelis, The Quest for Identity, (New York:

Company, 1958), p. 1'82.
2 5Ibid •• p.

-

W. W, Norton and

183.

26Ayres, Societl, pp. 92-93.
27Leslie A. White, The Evolution of Culture (New York: HcGraw-Hill Book
Co., 1959), PP• 32-57; Fred Cottrell-;-Energy: and Societ;y: The Relation Between
Energy: and Social Change and Economic Qevelo:eme_n,1, (New York: IvlcGraw-Hill
BookCo., Inc., 19.5.5), p. 2-.
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energy available." 28

In a masterful presentation of his thesis, Cottrell
r=.

shows how energy resources can be measured and what levels are necessary for
countries to have a "high energy" level and what constitutes a "low energy"

"ro
~--

~

;;;;, -

b

status.

White states, "The technological process may be analyzed ••• into

two components or aspects.

On the one hand, we have energy harnessed and

expanded, and on the other, the mechanical means with which this is
accomplished." 29 Perhaps kyres recognized this important factor in a very
undeveloped sense,30 but was not interested in pursuing it.
in view of the very lucid treatments by Cottrell and

~~ite,

It does, however,
seem to limit

some of Ayres's comprehension of the climate.for progressive·techno1ogica1
accomplishments.
Ayres made clear that combinations occur because of tool progression
and that this progression is geometrical rather than arithmetical,

He

asserted, "We know with certainty that inventions and discoveries are
combinations of tools, instruments, instrumentally manipulated materialsJ
and that the more tools there are, the.greater is the potentiality of
31
technical inventions and dis~covery. u
Again he stated, " • • , • contrary
.

.

to popular belief, no knowledge and no art has ever been lost, though any
one may have disappeared from some particular locality.

The creation of

new patterns does not mean that old ones have been lost, but rather that a

28 Cottrell, p. 12.
29White, Evolution, p. 5).
3°Ayres, Societ~, p. 113.
3t1Pid., PP• 92-9).
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new dimension, which extends the possibilities of old ones, has been added."
Hheeiis added:

32

"The devices which transform man's environment--whether they

be material, as the automobile, or intellectual, as the differential
calculus--proliferate by geometric progression.

The more tools in existence,

the more tool-combinations are possible."3.3
Ayres believed that there was no final authority in the technological
process except function and efficiency.

It is often necessary.to admit

ignorance because answers are not available.

But problem solVing, when it

does occur, opens up paths for further development and progression.
not retrogressive.

It is

It does not look bacla-tards, although it may repeat

experiments from the past if they are thought to warrant further investigation.
In other words, this process is flexible and experimental but never static.
Utllike the institutional process, which does not admit tentativeness but
rather thrives on certainty and dogma, the instrumental or technological
process is always seeking new solutions.

Ayres noted, "Tool activities

postUlate a division of labor the sole criterion of which is efficiency,
.
.
34
whereas the sole criterion of status is ceremonial."
There is a continuity
35
in the technological process, a basic progressive logic.
If one tool is
adequate, others can result, allowing for other inventions or solutions.
Thus, "The flow of values in human experience--of ends-j.n-view which in turn
become means to other ends-in-view--is of course an uninterrupted process,"3 6

32Ayres, Theo17, p. 211.
3

~eelis,

"'4
~ Ayres,

p, 79!

Socia~~.

3.5Ibid.' p. 115.

36Ibid.

p. 136.
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. Wheelis shows Ayres's basic reasoning in the progress of the technological
process in these statements:

.;_j

•• The introduction of keels into a culture that contains·
sails and rudder is likely to yield sailing ships •. The
. perfection of ail internal combustion engine by a culture that
contains buggies and kites will certainly res1llt in automobiles
and airplanes. A historical chart of such devices, therefore,
has the appearance of a logrithmic graph: The entries become .
most crowded together as one approaches the present. This
i------:-~pr-±ne-'.J:Vl-e--d-o-e-s--not-,--o-f--c-oi:.tl"~a:s-s-e-rt--tha--t-trretechnolo g1.cal _achievements of 1960 will be more numerous or more signific~t
than those of 1950; its applicability is to time spans of.
greater length. Nor does it assert that the technological
process is an imperative. Coercive institutio~al power may
retard it, may, indeed bring it to a complete stop, as
evidenced by thecontinuing existence of stone age culture in
some parts of the world. Its validity is as a principle
rather than law. It asserts only that the instrumental pr~7ess
possesses an inherel"lt dynamic of accelerating progression.
Junker, elaborating' on Ayres's technological principle, says, "• •• tools
do not exist alone, they exist within cultures which also contain static
institutional relationships involving power, class and status.

But

technology is the dynamic force making for change while institutional
behavior is past and habit oriented.

Technology is thus-conceived as the

master principle for explaining social change--not the only item to be
taken into consideration but the key principie."JB
Junker goes on to show that Ayres thought of resources as standing in
a functional relationship with tools.

He said, ''Resources then are always

in the state of becoming because tools are always in the state of
development.

Resources in this sense are never 'natural' resources, they

37wheelis, p.

-----

79.

·38Louis J, Junker, "The Social and Economic Thought of Clarence Ayres,"
(unpubl. Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1962), pp. 94-96.
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a1~e al1~a.ys defined by tools in conjunction with which it may be used, .. 39
The combinations which are al1owed in the framework o.f nature were, of
course, limited to the extent natilre allows, but since this limitation is
'
'
4o
beyond our conception, resources may be thought to be virtua11y unlimited.
One of the most insistent emphases in Ayres's theory of the technological
or instrumental process is that tool-behavior is universal in nature,

He

continually made the central point that tool-behavior is for all in its
usage. - It does r1ot- draw invidious distinctions.

There is no equivocation. -

It serves not upon the basis of rank or status but upon the basis of its
functional adequacy,

Ayres saids

• • • • there are two important qualifications to these
_developments. One is that technology is no respecter of
persons. 't•lhat one can do, others can do. The advantage
enjoyed by the pioneers of industrialization is bound to
be short-lived as other peoples learn to use machines;
and in the case of modern weapons, the greater the scale
the larger the number of persons who must be trained not
only to the use but a4,~o to the fabrication of the
instruments of power.
The point Ayres made is that tool usage itself is cumulative on the very
basis that the instrumental process does not set up boundaries; it breaks
them down._

Of coti.rse, the use of the tool may then be institutionalized, as

in the case of the use of weapons of warfare.

But the tool does not create

the warfare; it is impervious to the destructive consequences of such
institutional practices.

Still, as Dewey made clear, the means employed

is very much associated with the ends achieved.

39

Ibid.' p. 96.

4oAyres,

Societ~,

41Ib'd

p. 205.

-~··

p. 113.

Dewey stateda

--~----------~---·-

·~~---~

-~~- ~--~

--- --

•• • The end-in-view is that particula1~ activity which
operated as coordinating factor of all other subactivites
involved, Recognition of the end as coordination or unified
organization of activities, and of the end-in-view as the
special activity which is the means of effecting this coordination, does away with any appearance of paradox that seems
to be attached to the idea of temporal continuum of activazies
in which each successive state is equally ends and means,
Ayres maintained that the technological process was cooperative in the

'
4)
Mutual aid is .a basic condition of the technological process,"

cooperative.

He also said, "All people prize tools, and value skill • • • • True values
are trans-cultural--they are the same for all men--because they are all
interrelated. All are manifestations of the same process, the Jife process
44 .
'
of mankind."
Technological activity, according to Ayres, was innovative:
Technological activity continually gives rise to innovations
resulting from putting together things in new ways by people
who have no business doing so. Not only do such things happen
in defiance of the established ways of doing things; quite
commonly they force the devising of new organizational patterns.
New positions must be filled for which there are no traditional,
authentic, hereditary occupants. In short, organizati~nal
fludity is the sine qua ~ of technological progress. 5
Ayres recognized that tools must be used in a context, otherwise their
efficiency would be impaired,
time.

But the context becomes more expansive with

Both conceptual or symbolic tools, therefore, along with physical

42 John Dewey, Theor.y of Valuation (Chicago:

1939), P• 50.

.

43Ayres, Societ;y:, p.---1-69
44Ibid.' p. 167.
45Ibid.

---.

p. 1)7.

Universityof Chicago Press,
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tools progress along a continuum.

Ayres once remarked:

, , • Even today we use sticks to dig with on occasions,
and (if one had survived) we cou1d take a prehistoric
digging stick out of its museum cabinet and dig with it
as its prehistoric maker did. By the same token we have
better too~g today, and by the same criterion human life
is better.
Or again Ayres stated:
-i-----_______:__--t-~o----o-ne-----wh-o----ha-s--ever------u-sed----a:-tcroi--and-every-'n·uuran-oeing

- has done so virtually throughout life--has failed to have
the feeling on countless occasions that the materials he
- is dealing with are deliberately eluding him. This is not
a holdover from primitive animism. We are not annoyed with
our automobiles and our television sets because we learned
about gremlins at our mothers' knees. The real source of
our annoyance as we know quite well, is the difficulty of
the problem--an unexpected difficulty, perhaps, but one
that is none the less genuine and serious for being unexpected
· and seemingly trivial. 1·!oreover, this is an experience
which "brain workers" share with "hand workers," Indeed,
I put these phrases in quotation marks by way of reco~izing
that t!1e apparent distinction is quite arbitrary. All hand
worke.rs are of course brain workers, and vice versa, as their
common trials themselves sug~est. Everyone who has ever tried
to hammer out a paragraph knows that nothing is more exasperating
than the inability to think of the right word to fit a given
context--the feeling that such a word exists, that it is in
fact so common as to be virtually in daily use, but that ·at
the moment when nothing else will do, it is maliciously
eluding its would-be user.47
Ayres was convinced, then, that finally the technological process was
progressive.

He saw this process in broad perspectives.

believe in a "great man" theory of human invention.

He did not

To be sure, there

were geniuses, but they along with all others must build on the "foundation

46

J.P.iE•'

P•

85.

47Ibid •• p •. 145.
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blocks" of cultural experience.

Ayres affirmed:

True values are trans-cultural--they are the same for all
men--because they are all interrelated. All are manifestations
of the same process, the life process of mankind. All knowledge
is related to and conditioned by all. other knowledge, and all
skills are mutually contributory. Good health, freedom from
disease and famine, is contributory to the acquisition of skill
and knowledge; and the growth of knowledge and development of
skill are contributory to the acquisition of skill and knowledge;
and the growth of kn@ledge and development of skill are contribu~-----tO-~Y'--tG--geGG-hea'l-tJ?..-.~L__

__.--~--------~-----------~---:--~~~~

As 'fheelis understood, the instrumental process takes social unity for
granted whereas the institutional process seeks to make it ·a dogma.

Wheelis

says, "Continuously and tirelessly institutions assert the existence of a·
.social entity alone has meaning, arid that an individual life acquires
significance only by virtue of the individual's findin~ his place and
identity in this larger whole ... 49 On the other hand, 'Vt'heelis comments on
the instrumental process in this fashion:
Divested of all institutional patterns, the life of man would
portray the organic unity of the instrumental process, the .
continuity of arts and of technology. This process is one of.
increasing knowledge and control. . It has no terminus but it
has direction; and this direction is aw~y from ignorance,
superstition, cruelty, and helplessness. Individual life has
value and meaning by virtue of its participation in this
process. The fact of death, in this view, is reconcilable
with the activities of life, for a social process of which
the individual 1vas a part, to which he has contributed, and
which he can identify, su.rvi ves his individual ext~_nction,
Indeed, ldthout individual mortality the instrumental process
could not exist. For if no one died, then no one could be
born; al'?d growth and development would pass from the experience
of mankind. The progress of man is thus contin~ent ~pon ~he
succession of generations.50
·

48

Ibid., J?• 167 •..

~eelis, p~ 191.
5°Ibj_d,, p. 193.
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Ayres believed that the:r.e were many tools that man could use to
overcome the institutional resistance.

First, there were the physical

tools themselves, the precision tools. of industry.

But Ayres in his later

· •~itings omitted an earlier phrase that he had used extensively, namely,
"keeping the machines ·going."

He had come to see the need as well for

social tools, political tools, economic tools, and many other
"control tools."

t~~es

of

All of these tools must then fU into a proper context.

As. for economics, Ayres, for example, named four distinct principles:

First,·

it is indivisible and irresistible; second~ it spreads in inverse proportion
to institutional resistance; third,

c~pital

is necessary to insure the push

toward tool-development; and four, education is a must.51
The superiority of current instrumental tools can only be seen by
looking backward to view the ineffectiveness of past cultures.

But the

technological process is always forward-looking while "ceremonial behavior"
remains in its ustatus quo s4nce." ·Ayres stateda
Because tradition and tradition-grounded values play a large
part in the lives of all individuals and of all cormnunities,
it does not follow that all values are tradition:--grounded or
that· all comrmmi ties and· all human beings are equally traditionbound. On the contrary, rigorous .analysis of ceremonial values
themselves reveals the coexistence at al1 times of another and
different system of techno1ogically determined values; and the
experience of the \-lestern peoples during the past few centuries
(as well as that of other peoples in other times) reveals quite
unmistakably the progressive displacement of superstitution by
knowledge and of prejudice by reason. This trend is the hope
of all mankind. 52
.
.

51Ayres, Theor;x:, pp. xvii-xxv.
52Ayres, Society, p.

138.
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Summary
The first attempt by Ayres to distinguish the

"techno1o~ical

aspect"

of humanlife from the "institutional aspect" was to examine the piace of
science in the technological process.

-

Science was as "instrumental" to the

process .as one side of a coin is to the other side.
summation of the process.

·~

Yet science was not the

Science as a matter of fact could, under certain

circumstances, become the opposite of the technological process when it
became institutionalized.

However, Ayres saw over a longer period of time

that science was more process-oriented, and he was pleased with this modern
stance.

Science, then, was one side of the technological

proce~s,

the

thinking side, just as technology was the doing side• ·
For Ayres, the basic thrust of the "institutional process" was negative
to human improvement, albeit a very recognizable part of man's make-up.
Institutional values were not based upon experimentation or functional
efficiency but upon ceremony and authority.

Man falsely believes in one

aspect of his.life-activity that security comes through such "truths." But
the basic security of mankind, his well-being, lies elsewhere, according to
Ayres.

The tooi-process solves problems by the use of efficient and

functional tools, conceptual and physical.
not by ritual.

It is judged by performance and

Therefore, when superior performance is deomonstrated, the

institutional process gives way.

Butinstitutions can resist in a most

tenacious sense, because they represent the other side of man's nature.
Sometimes they resist by checking instrumental changes.

Sometimes there

is deception so that the institutional process seems quasi-technologlcal.

-~-

--------

6)
But the long history of mankind demonstrates clearly that the institutional
process can never triumph over the instrumental process.

AJTes stated:

~

-------

~

§ __

Like the first stone hand-ax, the firzt fire brand and
articulate speech itself, computerized automation as a
manj.festation of the technological process. Euman life and
well-being depends upon the furtherance of that process nol~
no less than it did a thousand years ago when (as we have
lately discovered) the foundations of the indsutrial economy
was being laid, or a million years ago when mankind was first
em arking upon its technological adventure. The values we
seek are those of human life and well-being. The process by
which we see~ them is an experimental process, as it has
always been. 3
·
. .
. . ·

53Ayres, Messiah, p. xii.
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CHAPTER FOUR.

THE UTOPIANISN OF AYRES'S SOCIAL THOUGHT a
~-

VALUE AND PROGRESS

The most controversial aspect of Clarence E. Ayres's social thought is
his contention that "tool behavior" is the locus of all human values and
that values are measurable through their extension in the life-process

scientists as "moral agnostics," due to their evasion.of critical judgments
pertaining to the. most "efficient" and most "effective" values.

Their

consensus that all cultures have a right to value whatever they choose to
value without outside interference was a capitulation that Ayres believed
to be intolerable.

If values havebeen proven to be "effective," then by

all means they should be implemented.

The whole existence of the human

race is dependent upon this act of judgment.
conundrum was only for the "agnostic."

Ayres stated that the other

"Economic thinking has always

embodied some conception of progress andmust always do so; for the concept
.

.

of va1ue :i.s the chief concern of economic thinking, and progress is
indissociable from value.

Agnosticism with re!!ard to value implies
1
agnosticism with regard to progress,"
Ayres believed strongly that

"technolo~"

was another term for

reason, and that reason affirmed values, and that values meant progress.
In his introduction to Toward

~

Reasonable

Societ~,

Ayres stated these

1c. E. Ayres, The Theory of Economic Progress (1944; rpt. New Yorks
Schocken Books, 1962):-p:-231."

conclusions definitively in various key pl"onouncements:
In a sense I am·writing this book fol" my owri satisfaction, But the concel."n which has prompted it is shared,
in oneway or another, by all thout:?htfuJ. people, Is
industrial society at a dead end, or rushing down a steep
place into obJ.ivj.on, as so many people seem to fear?
Committed as we are to a life of l."eason, are we thel"efol."e,
as both scientists and theologians seem to think,
spiritually crippled? Is it tl."ue that the modern mind,
nourished on science, is therefore spiritually sterile7
~----------~e~a~a our efforts to improve our lot short-circuited
by the impossibility of knowing in what direction
improvement lies? Hy answer to these questions is No,
2
and I am writing this book to try to justif7 that answer.
Again he said&
Is it not possible that values derive their meaning and
their sanction not only from tribal deities, and not
merely from parochial beliefs, but--at least in considerable
part--from the human adventure itself, from the quest for
knowledge and ever more knowledge and from the neverending struggle to harness the forces of nature to human
use? Are there not in all societies two sets of values,
sacred and profane, so to speak; and is it not the former
which differ so widely from people to people whereas the
latter are the same for all?J
He stated further:
What is essential is the coninuity of the process by
which tools and know-how have developed through the ages.
All peoples have participated in this process. For various
reasons some have been more "creative" than others, But
all have been possessed of some modicum of the knowledge
that is inseparable from the use of tools. 4

2c. E. Ayres, Joward ~ Rea~onable Scciet~, (Austin, Texasa
of Texas Press, 1951), P• 5.
J

.

.

Ibid., p. 6.

4

Thid. , P• 7.
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Beyond that, he stated:
In short, we have here a process in which all peoples have
participated, which has the same meaning for all, and which
therefore constitutes a standard of valuation for all.
Everyone knows what better and worse mean with reference
to tools, and all peoples judgesuch "betterness" and
"worseness" b;y the same standard. These values are the
same for all.->

·we know that supposedly absolute values not only do not
transcend human experience; they do not even transcend
the beliefs of the people who imagine them. The real ~ssue
is whether that is all--whether there is any standard of
value which has the same meaning for all peoples. That is
the question to which our present knowledge of the unbroken
continuity of what we now call science and technology
throughout the life process of mankind now gives an
affirmative answe1~..6
.
·
Ayres was then led to the belief that "technology" offered the locus
Of su-oreme value. to mankind, never eternal but far more p!OQTessive than

ending and "useful to all."
process" was not.

The "tool process" was never-

It was true in the sense that the ''ceremonial-

Thus, he deplored the emphasis of anthropology and social

science upon "Cultural Relativism."· He called this in essence an
.

evasion~

.

He could not believe that neutralitywas the·only approach to deal with
competing value systems.

Indeed, values were useful to all, because the
7
"tool" was no respecter of persons.
Ayres admitted quite readily to the plurality of value.s.

He made it

quite clear tha. man is quite obviously susceptible to "ceremonial" mores
as well as "technological" values.

5Ibid., p. 8.

6Ibid., p. 9.
7.I~id., p. 205.

--
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Finally, he reasoneds

customs and :ereferences or "ceremonialism."

d

But did this mean that there is no

r------------~-------

---·
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differe·nce between the two?

Were these two "worlds of discourse" to be

forever separated so that "technology" competed in the physical arrangements
of man's environment and "mores 11 in his value judgments?

That is, is there

basically no difference between a tribal,medicine man and a medical doctor
specializing in internal medicine? While the doctor specializing in internal
medicine may not have all the answers, he is certainly equipped with many
answers which pertain to life and death.

These answers work and they work

on any human person, not just a particular person in a particular culture.
Thus Ayres believed that there was a 11tility to scientific values.

So

technology is not man's best hope; it is his only genuine hope.
Ayres was both a critic of absolute moral theories and a critic of
. absolute neutrality concerning "technological values."

He was in truth

an "ethical cognitivist" as one of his former students clearly maintained&
Ayres is a persistent critic of the "pestilence of moral
agnosticism" by which he means radically relativistic theories
which deny the possibility of attaining an objective knowledge
of values. He-is equally critical of absolutist moral theories
rooted in a transcendental or supernatural matrix for, like other
pragmatists, he objects to "dualism" in all its forms .•••• He
traces its historical developnent to the philosophy of David Hume
and hence to its contemporary expression by Alfred J. Ayer, whose
Language, Truth and logic contains a classic separation of facts
from values in its distinction between synthetic statements
(empirically verifiable) and emotive statements (evaluative)
• • • • Ayres is an ethical cognitivist because he believes
moral choices are essentially objective. 8
For Ayres then the idea of progress is not in disrepute; rather it is the
terminology that suffers a la.ck of credibility.

He was conscious that every

effort must be made to show that progress in its metaphysical sense is

8
Rick Tilman, "Value Theory, Planning, and Reform: Ayres as Incrementalist
and Utopianp" Journal of Economic I~, VIII, (December, 1974)f pp. 689-690.
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untenable, but still progress is not entirely relativistic either,

It is

a paradox that "it is the progress of science which has rendered the idea
of progress itself supposedly untenable."9 What Ayres struggled to
maintain was an "absoluteness'' in values which were less than metaphysical-progress meant simply.that the human species benefited unequivocably.

It

might, he·suggested, be very close to the meaning he desired to use the
term "change," but he rejected the substitution just the same, for it
diminishe.d the meaning that he sought.

He stated furthers .

When a scientist speaks of the progress of science other
scientists do not leap up to reproach him having uttered
nonsense, for the phrase "the progress of science" is not
nonsense. Neither does it depend for its meaning on any
preconceived idea of what "the total realization of all
scier1tific knowledge" might be, The meaning to which such
a phrase refers is not that of a quantity of knowledge--not
a finite quantity any more than infinity. It is a ~ocess
which :i.s now going on and which may quite reasonably be
.
·
conceived as continuing.10
The focus that Ayres used to defend his thesis of
to "tool progression"--was one of
systems" and "emotional elements,"

separatin~

value~-progress

due

values from both "belief

He believed, nevertheless, that both

of these factors were a basic part of man's makeup.
both were subservient to the "real thing."

His thesis was that

Values that were proven meant

that people could believe in them and get excited over them, but the
·"realness" was in neither belief nor emotion but rather in tool demonstration
and the appropriate applicati(?n for human welfare.
asked:

In this regard, he

''\fuat hope is there for a community whose intellectual leaders

not only cannot demonstrate the superiority of their 'tl·ay of life over that
of any other people but have convinced themselves that no such demonstration ·

9Ayres, Theorl, p. 24o.
10Ibid,

is intellectually possible?" 11 On the other hand, Ayres was yery sensitive
1,:

to the prevailing psychological theories which lay stress upon the

-----

;5·~----~~~

conditioning due to emotional elements in hun1an behaviors
It is very much more apparent today than it has ever been
before that irrational impulses and emotional seizures play
a very considerable part' in human behavior: that the emotional
experiences of early childhood color the whole of subsequent
experience; that the process by which animal impulses and
-11--~~~~~ame-t--i:~ns---are-curbed,--cha-nnel-ed-,--and-''-~rabi-imate-d:''-by-so<!ra-1~~~~~~~~---~~~~~~

conventions is extremely subtle and pervasive one; and
consequently that even our most rational behavior is always
subject to the suspicion of being a "rationalization" of
hidden, sublimated, and symbolized emotions, The psychopathologists do not assert that man is the helpless victim
of his emotions, But their studies do complement those of
social anthropology in underscoring the signifi.cance of the
process by which man's emotional nature undergoes social
conditioning.12
.
Still, Ayres insisted that while emotional behavior can be deceptive
and nullify the recognition of values that unite the human species; it is
also evidenced in activities that provide a sesne of "causal interrelatedness
that runs through all human activities," 13 Thus, human emotions are both
"irrational" and "rationai," both ~'ceremonial" and "technological and
·human,"

As Ayres stated:

We know as· well as we know anything that human emotionality is antecedent to all ceremonialism. It originates
in the organism. The system of culture patterns only
gives form and.direction to our vital forces. To be sure,
such shaping of emotional fixation and expressiQR is
tremendously important: but it is never final.1~

11Ayres, Societx, p. 1¥) •.
12Ibid., P• 83.

13Ibi.~.

f

P• 155.

_2._·'

P• 159.

14Ib.d
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Ayres recognized full well the cries of alarmists about the state of
human affairs, a state bent upon destruction rather

than

human welfare--such

problems as litter, pollution, weapons for warfare, multiplication of
automobiles traffic, and industrial waste •. He shrugged these laments off
as superficial and ill-advised.

The very nature of such problems a11owed

for a climate to exist in which better solutions would be found,
summarized:

He

"Unbiased observation should be sufficient to convince anyone

that the force of moral conviction is just as strong today .as it has ever
been, not"uithstanding the increasing secularism of Western civilization. ul5
He concluded:

"We do incontestably know.more today about the uniformities

of nature and the interdependence of all human activities than men have
ever known before, and we are therefore no less incontestably in a better
position tomake sound judgments ofvalue than men have ever been before," 16
'l'he major thrust of Ayres's argument about "technological behavior" then
is that it is unified because it has value,

Allvalues in the plural sense

must of necessity point toward progress of human well-being if they are
·"real" values,

Ceremonial values are "real" in another sense; they bind

people through emotive processes and belief-systems.

But they are only

ultimately legitimate in their usage when they represent the ongoing .
enhancement of the species:
Falsehoods flourish and are infinitely varied; but all peoples
mean the same thing by 11 true".and "false 11 and all attach the
same values to both. Among some peoples (ourselves included)

15Ib.d
__
J.._,, P•

16o.

16Ibid,, p. 162.

~
§
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the art of deception is widely practised, and the skilled
deceiver is greatly admired. But the very meaning of
deception implies that the truth is known at least·to the
deceive!"~ and that the victim of the deception j_s victimized
precisely because truth is great and Nill prevail. It
prevails because, like the uniformities of nature of which
it is a frojection in human experience, it is the same for
all men. 7
.
.
.
Again Ayres is cast in the light of a contextualist, it would seem,
He desJ.red to sllow

t:nar; -tool operationalism" meant the direction of progress-1

the tool gets the job done for all alike.

But having i machine that works

for all does not in itself mean that. you will have the "symbolic values"
to guarantee continuation of the incentive· for progress.
used in a destructuve mariner as well as useful.manner.

"Tools" can be
Thus, Ayres believed

that "tool-efficiency" was dependent upon a "value-climate."

He recognized

the controversial nature of his arguments when he admitted the "mystery" of
this juxtaposition.

Using Asian, Oceanic, and African peoples as an example,

·Ayres maintained that "the freedom the Western peoples have achieved is a
function of the abundance. they enjoy. • • • •• 18 Ayres recognized that
. explanations as to why this occurred were difficult to come by, but it was
clear, nevertheless, "that the fruits of skill and knowledge are good,
notwithstanding the dangers they entail, and that the values they signalize
and foster are all li1terrelated, since they are all functions of scientific
1
knowledge and technological competency." 9
.A:yres delineated the values he believed to derive from the·· extension

17Ibid., p. 167.
18Ibid., p. 169.
19 Ibid.

~

.
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of technology as follows: freedom, equality, security, abundanc~ and other
"moral" values, 20 But Ayres believed that it was impossible to determine
which came first, the technological process or the value recognition--both
were joined together in the continuum of the life process.

For example,

in regard to freedom, Ayres stated, "Certainly the most important freedom
is freedom of the mind; and freedom of mind is both a prior

condi~ion

to

invention and discovery and a further consequence of all technological .
development. "21 In a later assessment, however, he maintained that freedom
is resultant from the technological process, since the machine does away
.
22
with ignoranc~ and poverty.
Still, he admitted to the "symbolic nature"
of such a statement, since freedom is not in any literal sense the result
of machine invention but rather the result of the process whereby man uses
23
its production accordingly. This is the freeing aspect,
Freedom is neither in the possession of the individual nor in the
control of the community, according to Ayres, but both become a part of the ·
paradox ·when freedom is clearly comprehended.

There is no individual in the

"totality of the life process;" only corporate existence with individuals
·.

as a part.

.

..

·.

For Ayres, freedom mandated restraint.

Yet dissent was necessary

in the total scheme of things or else we would be unable to know who was
right.

lcyres seemed to imply that the greatest complexity demanded the

greatest variability in order to reach a suitable consensus.

20Ibid.'

PP• 171-294.

21,;£bid~, P• 181,
22 loid,,
P• 182.
2 3Ibid,

Rightly

~
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conceived, freedom is one of the

cro~ming

values, because it sets the limits

whereby the "progress of the tool process 11 is guaranteed, and it allows the
individual as a person the access to facts which liberate him from the
arbitrary controls of the would-be controller.

Freedom. means that persons

are guaranteed the right of inquiry, of combating ignorance, of experimenting,
and developing.

"Freedom does not mean absence of government. To conceive
it so is to lapse into primitive negativism." 24 Ayres seems to have meant

by this statement that the right of individuals to do their ·~own thing" is
not freedom at all; rather, implied in freedom is stability for. all, which
can only come. through complex social organization, that is, ''the freedom of
government, and j_ndeed of. all the instru.rnentalj.ties of organization, from the
tyranny of status; operational freedom; constructive freedom; the freedom
to inquire; and the freedom· to create." 25
As for

equalit~,

Ayres believed the industrial Western civilization has

helped us to understand what egalitarianism means.

He does not mean that

individual differenc.es such as those in intelligence, physical attributes,
or social characteristics are equated,

He emphasized the part of urbanization

in bringing about a bourgeois society and the very term "middle" means
the accomplishment of a great amount of equality or flexibility--when you
have but two classes there tends to be domination by the upper-class.
reality of mobility, too, allows for

24Ibid,, p. 185.

-.

25Ib'd
--2:_·, P• 186.

a breakdown

of class determinism.

The
Unlike
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caste, class is not binding when

the~e

is, a mixed and open class system,

is opportunity for mobility, that

Ownership by "management" may-indeed

seem to bode but ill for egalitarian concepts, but for Ayres such was not
the case.

He maintained that participation in multiple areas of the .

industrial system

p~ovided

safeguards for abuses tha.t might otherwise

occur. 2 6 Ayres admitted that injustices did occur and inequality was a.
constant threat to an industrial way of life.

liowever, despite fumbling

and vested interests, equality was the thrust of scientifiG enlightenment
and technological processes. 27 Nor does s~ience lend support to man's
biological "otherness" as abasic :r:eason.for inequality.

There are

differences, of course, but Ayres maintained that they occur in all segments
of a society and not uniformly related to any one race or segment, and
social scientists have learned to pinpoint them and to deal with them. 28
The_social consequences have been recognized as the reason for inequality
by social scientists, and social consequences can be

overcome~

Ayres often worked himself into a· quandar>y in defense of his major
·thesis concerning progress in the "tool process."

He argued quite paradox-

ically that everi dictatorships that have sought to possess the ''technological
process" will in the end find that equality will result.
will of its own weight break their hold.29

The very process

Ayres did not pursue this

argument, though, since it is obvious that present circumstances do not

26Ibid., pp. 187-195.
27Thid., P• 204.
28 Ibid.
29Thid.p p. 205.
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warrant early speculation to this effect.

For example, why do not fully

industrialized countries.such as the USSR move toward full freedom for all?
Ayres, no doubt,· would have replied, "give them time."

At any rate, Ayres

believed that equality occurred and occurred most conspicuously when the
"tool" operated in grand ascendancy and when persons were free to let it
be their master.

Then, it indeed worked to the benefit of a11.

30

· Securi ~ • .Ayres considered to be one of the fundamental values, and
he was certain ·that greater security had been won for Western civilization
because of the "tool process." l1yths did not buy us a greater life span
or more advanced health outlook.

Scientific knowledge and superstition

are not only mutually exclusive, but other quasi-respectable philosophies
·such as existenialism are just as pernicious, because in the end they only
seek to provide a hope built upon Wishes, not upon concrete possibilities,
So llyres remarked of the "tool process" vis

!1:.

vis "ceremonial claims,"

that "judged by thestandard of actual security, mankind has. done well, and
never better than in modern industrial society."

31

.

l·lhen people really know

what science can produce, Ayres was convinced, they choose technological
solutions; the problem is that so many areas in life are as yet without
answers or the problems have not been properly defined.

Iri this situation,

people revert to their "ceremonial-behavior patterns."

Ayres admitted that

while tool-behavior provi.ded anst.rers, there was always the perverted usage
of the "tool."

This occurred when it was made a "fetish" and used for the

30Ibid., P• 206,

Jlfbid., P• 210.
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advantage of persons or groups.
values

n~de

But he believed that in fact technological

people aware'of the falacies of myths and status promoters.

stated in utter confidence:

"Life itself is

becomin~

He

less ceremonial, less

a matter of authority and obedience, more responsive to demonstrable facts-in a word--more rational. I am We'll aware that this judgment is contrary
to prevailing opinion ... 32
·The "snap" in Ayres's arguments centers around his viewpoint that change
occurred mainly in response to the creation of tools, superior tools, and
that "ceremonies" and "myths" keep men chained to the status quo.

So

indeed our only hope as a htiman race is to keep on changing to cope with
the new threats to our existence:

"The process of efficient organization for

mutual advantage, by which dawn men first learned to secure themselves
against the rigors of the winter season, is still going on, and may still
secure us against the hazard of mutual destruction.")) It appears that this
is orie of the strongest parts of Ayres's social theory.

He showed consis-

tently that changes occurred in societies and cultures not by "beliefsystems" or by "myths," but by means of "tool-intervention." This bei.ng so,
Ayres believed that it was possible to distinguish between what was useful
and what was damaging. to the human species.

Technology provided a

"recognizable" standard of what enhanced life am assured human welfare.
Consistent with his emphasis upon technology as the creator of the
"good life," Ayres believed in the value of abundance.

32Ibid., p •. 218.
33Ibid., p. 227.
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as his major field of endeavor, this was an emphasis that he constantly
pursued. ·It is impossible for the present writer to evaluate his contri-

~

·-

bution in the economic field, much less to assess his acceptance by
economists.

There is no doubt that the school of "Institutionalism" strone:ly

supported the contribution of Ayres, and he appears to have a strong

followin~

in the United States, but the "institutionalist approach" is also_:_s_tmngly._____
challenged and maligned.

___c_~~-~~-~

Harren J. Samuels mentions some salient points

of "Institutionalism Economics" in an article written in honor of A~es.3 4
These were:

The growth of the market and economic growth and development· _

are dependent upon the extent of institutional organization

a~resistance.

The social and cultural aspects of people is basic to an understanding of
thei.r economic systems, for economic determination is not merely a legal.
function or market framework but the whole organizational structure of a
society.

It is, according to "Institutionalists," a holistic operation

which includes all aspects of a culture.
There can be no doubt as to Ayres's position on abundance, for he
believed it central to egalitarian ways of a society, and he thought this.
to be the "idealn path.

For Ayres, then, the key to understanding the

better way of life was not merely surpluses but also the availability of
the surpluses for the people.

The "old order" or ''conservative economics"

magnified conservation, "market determination," "hoarding," "free enterprise,"
with some self-interest in mind.

The justificatiion of conserving economic

goods was that the market must be protected. at all costs.

The "market"

3llvlarren J. Samuels, "Introduction: Market, Institutions, and Technology,"
of Economic Issues, VIII (December, 1974), pp. 66)-669.

Jour~:_~}
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and "free enterprtse'' became gods to be matntained,

There lvas an emphasis

upon "ceremonial waste" to keep matters in hand and in control, but
abundance for all was thought to be the arch enemy of the. market.
believed that abundance should be
privileged.

for·all~

Ayres

not "ceremony" for the

He said, ""We do not abhor the waste of .our social superiors

but tolerate it because of their superiority.

In literal truth we regard

abundance as a heavenly illusion."35 Ayres believed that while it was
the common assumption that there was no way that good things can be
available to all, just the revers·e was true-..;namely, good things must be
available for all to assure

greate~

freedom for a11.

For Ayres, technology.

reached beyond the status quo of fear or of privilege and created abundance
that could be shared for a common good,

But Ayres did not believe

technology should be espoused either because it could provide the food we
eat, or that food should be consumed because it·is necessary to eat to stay
alive; rather, both should be seen as a context.

He repeated:

Abundance is not· good in any secondary or derivative
sense, "merely" because it derives from the technological
process. Nor is the technological process inherently
disagreeable in itself but goOd in consequence of producing
abundance. Both are good because-they are inseparable--from
each other, and from all other real goods. In a sense
abundance is the aggregate of all goods and derives its
goodness from all that is good. But in an equally valid
sense all other goods derive their meaning from that of
abundance, since a good is anything we w~uld be better
off for having more of. Thus abundance carries us back
to the interrelatedness of all human experience, from
which the meaning "good'; derives, and it is that inter. relatedness 't-Ihich is likewise. manif~gt in the technological
process .from which abundance fJows •.

35.Ayres, Society, p. 235.
36)-bid., P• 246.
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Ayres defended the
the contrary,

excelle~

of Western culture, despite critics to

He was not concerned with raising a.!!.eneration of "purists."

No generation was ever so "pure" as to reach a "high culture" that was
beyond challenge.

The very diversity present in cultures seemed, rather

than precluding, to make possible the outreach for excellence.

Striving

for new excellence as well as sharing new forms was basic to the technological
process.

It does not damn a culture to have some forms of art, music, drama,

and writing available for all.
not upset Ayres.

Popular culture and kitsch, therefore, did

He asked in this sense if excellence was really related

only to rarity or was it indeed more related to expansiveness?

As with

abundance, Ayres perceived expansiveness to lead in part to creative
·endeavor while still providing some "luxuries" or "good things" to the
n1asses.

He defended "accessibility" as the mark of true technological

value; at least the opportunity for excellence is ther for all.3? Nor is
conformity always a burden.
mass~communication

He said, "Let us concede at once that the

industries do assail us with egregious mispronunciations,

outrageous solecisms, and assorted illitercies and vulgarities.
the decisive question is, what is the trend?"3B

Nevertheless,

For A-yres, then, the major

concern was the trend and for him there were no signs of incompetence at
. 39
the top.

37Ibid., P•

254.

38Ibi.d. t P•

255.

39Ibid., P•.

256.
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Thus Ayres defended not only differing standards of art and craftmanship
but more basically the expansion of "truth."

So he maintained:

·~

--

~

There is no basis whatever for the indictment of industrial
society or1 a charge of lack of wisdom. Such a charr,:e can of
course be brought against particular individuals today as in
all previous ages. But the vast increase in knowledge which
industrial society has achieved has not been won at the .
expense of wisdom, any more than has abundance been achieved
t-~~~~~~a-"'t--cc·=th=e--cce=xP~. ense of an~h_e~Jn±__oLexc~eJlenc-a,_inc-1-w.B ng~~~~~-~~~~-'-----'-~--~individual skill and pride of craft.40 .
.
Finally, Ayres dealt with anoverall summation of.what might be termed
peak values. in the "private" or "personal" areas.

He believed that in these

areas too, industrial society brought help and not hindrance.

But Ayres

gave only a scant five pages to such an effort, an effort that seemed almost
aborted from the beginning.
!

.

What Ayres seemed to imply was that certain

"ceremonial" values may.have a specific relationship to known "technological"
values, and this was not by accident.

The very nature of "technological

inquiry" probably, or so it would seem, mean:t that individual exclusivism
had to yield to social demands.

Efficiency in the lmole human community

.demanded more than mere self-interest.
'VTas

And efficiency, while compromised,

never forsaken . even by those who would go their own way in their many

pursuits for happiness.
Ayres maintained that elaborate crermonies about cleanliness have
been with mankind from the earliest times, and medical and hygienic
findings have confirmed their appropriateness.

Lying is ceremonially

deplored through the ages, and in modern society you cannot build a
worthwhile organizational pattern with lying as its cornerstone.

4oibi~.' p~ 26o.

Ayres
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said:

"In short, the simple personal morality of truth-telling is a
h==~

~-

projection of the technical necessities of organized societj_es, and hence
no clear line can be drawn between the values of individual character and
41
those of society at large,"
As to sexual continence, here too Ayres

"
~~--

believed there was a need for moderation based upon the need for solidarity
of human organization,

Efficiency, Ayres believed, dep~e~n~d~e~d~u~p~o~n~a~s~o~c1~·a~1~·----~----~~-----

consensus, but he was also shrewd enough to see that many of these
standards can only come
individual moral guilt.

throu~h

"social need"

and not through imputation of

He stated:

It may be that, if a commission of efficiency experts
were given the task of devising a system of sex behavior
that·wouJ.d comport with the organizational necessities of
industrial society, what they would come up with would
differ from the prevailing ''system" in various respects,
But it would almost certainly not be entirely different,
Almost certainly its guiding principle would be a regularization of sexual relations, 42
As to honesty, Ayres did not believe it was always the best policy when
considered individually, but he knew it was the best policy
socially, and he expressed his viewpoint in this manner1

wh~n

considered

"Honesty is the

best policy for individuals--not intermittent, but continuous, reliable
43
honesty--because it is the best policy for societies,"
Ayres summarized his social-individual value

bel~efs

as follows:

The same things are true of the intimate, persona1 values
of "private" life that are true of the ideals to which societies
dedicate themselves. Ai1 values are fraught with emotion, and
all values have their traditional, tribal aspects; and since
the "personal" virtues and vices are those which are so
identified for us in childhood, that being why we think of

41Ibid., P• 267.
1

-I-2Ibid.' P• 269.

4)Ibid., P• 270.
-- - - - -
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them as personal, they are the values we identify most
insistently with our tribal mores by reason of the emotional
conditioning through which tribal mores are transmitted.
But. it is also true that the effective working relationships
which constitute the life process of mankind speJ.l out
values which thus derive not froin our sentiments but from
our necessities, and this likewise is just as true of the
va1ues that prevail in intimate personal relationships as
those which pertain to whole societies. The truth is that
honesty, decency, and veracity are not only the best policy
but the only policy in terms of which hum ftRLJ.-b_e_J.n_·
-'g"--s_·_c_a_n_l'l_o_r_k_____~-----~~~
4
t-----------n-II:fietlTe-r~l~ve ootter than the animals. · ·
SUNMARY

Ayres believed that the "technological process" produced the locus of
all value for mankind because it moved constantly in the.direction of
improved human welfare.

Reason was the best policy not because it was the

·only plane on which man lived but rather because it proved its merit by
efficiency and maintenance.

Anthropologists and social scientists in

attempting to be value-free are in essence striving for the impossible.

How

can society live without judgments? The "technological process" or
"instrumental process" demands· both thinking and doing.
are vital to the life process.
order.

Therefore, judgments

Beyond this, judgments are not of the same

The "tool process" allows for utility but the "ceremonial process"

makes emotion and preference the key responses.
not eliminate ''belief" and

"emotion~"

The "tool process" does

for they become a part of and not

separate from the value of finding "better tools."

In reality then, the

"tool" is supreme because it gurantees man more satisfaction, more security,
more abundance, more freedom, more excellence, and more truth.

__

44Ibid ,

This is not

83
to say 'that the "tool" has brought us to the ultimate in our problem:-solving
ability, for no "tool" has the keys to all .the problems of life.

But the

.EL
G

"tool" is the best process known to man to answer his specific problems of

~

~

existence.

Hhile it is never complete, final, or the ultimate, it is

progressive in its value.

The tool process is ongoing then as life is,

and its utility is proven over the long span of human history.

It is

never static, however, for today's answers will never suffice,.except in a
cumulative sense, to answer tomorrow's problems.

But of one fact Ayres

was resolutely convinced; the answer of technology was superior to the
answar·or "emotion," "belief'," and "ceremony," and it alone could provide
the direction for the preservationof the species.

Progress was attainable

·because the "technological process" was more in evidence in the solving of

man's innumerable problems.

-

·r~~~~
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CHAPTER FIVE.

CONCLUSIOF AND CRITIQUE:

AYRES'S CONTRIBUTIOtT TO THE

UNDK-{ST.ANDING OF SOCIAL BFYAVICR VS. HIS ABSTRACT UTOPIMHSY.
REYJA.qDING THE UH.TI1ITED PROGRESS OF TECEl>10IOGICAI VAlUES.

It is well to repeat iri the conclusion the thesis of this study dea1ing
with the social thought of Clarence E. Ayres, namely, that although Ayres's
heory of progress
.

.

.

~s

damaging to his sociological--theory as a whole, nis

.

.

.

.

theory of the basic dichotomy of social action, that of technology and
ceremonialism, deserves greater credit than it has received and is
profoundly significant sociologically.
I

The major contribution of Ayres to sociological theory, though it has
not been suitably recognized, is his inclusion of a concept of culture with
concepts of tec:b...nology, economic "institutionalism," and the nature of the
self,
theory.

All of these themes are intertwined into a comprehensive social
Such a social theory is attractive because of its complexity and

the range of social facts and considerations it involves.

It iS connnon

enough to have sociological theories presented about social organization ·
and social institutions, to have anthropological theories presented about.
culture and symbolic behavior, to have economic theories presented about
market reaction and the price system, and to have psychological theories
presented about human conditioning and human interaction, but it is rare
when a writer possesses the scholarly equipment 'to combine these areas into
a holistic approach,

Ayres did not only that, but proceeded to extend

these approaches and to take into consideration the areas of philosophy
and

ethic~

especially with his keen insight into John Dewey's pragmatism and

8.5
instrumentalism.

This contrasts with approaches where various social

disciplines are compartmentalized and where other disciplines are considered
with suspicion.

Such a posture can be the death knell to social science,

which by its very nature demands the greatest number of alternative
approaches conceivable.

For Ayres, it was inconceivable that science or

social science could claim to be a "sacred cow."

Science meant full

inquiry as well as full implementation,
Another contribution of Ayres to social thought was his comprehensive
interpretation of Thorstein Veblen's works.

He showed with erudite

shrewdness that Veblen was one of-the.. greatest theorists of the twentieth
century, because he perceived man as partly governed by his "instinct
of workmanship, 11 an instinct that made technology central to his behavior.
~l!_ough

Ayres was aware of the deficiency of

using such unacceptable terms

as "instinct" as a substitute for "cultural self," he nevertheless realized
that Veblen, above all others; had found a key to the dichotomy of human
behavior.

Veblen had seen clearly that man's activity was determined by

his culture and technology just as his other side struggled to maintain
the status quo through "ceremony" and "pe.cuniary pleasures," "conspicuous
consumption," and "waste."

The change agent was technology, and man to

improve his life situation was dependent upon his "worklnanship," his
productive side.
One of the most forceful presentations of Ayres concerns this
assumption of technological value.

But Ayres's extension of this theory

of technological efficiency does not depend upon a "reg:i.T!e of workmanship"

~

-
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as in the case of Veblen but rather upon the assurance

th~t

the ... tool

process" ldll continue to gain ascendancy by its own efficiency.

The

''tool" itself, which includes both physical and symbolic tools, has the
inner dynamic to break down institutional opposition and to bring about
better human values,
It was in

stu~ying

John Dewey's "instrumentalism" that

to bring his own social thought to fruition.
known through experimentation and function.

Ayr~e.._.s..__.w._..a...,s~a._...b...,l..,.e,__~-'-~'--~~~~-

The valuation process was
Thus, Ayres belteved that

Dewey supplied the missing link to Veblen's dichotomy of human behavior.
Dewey in his Theory of Valua.tion1 had seen clearly that values .are of two .
kinds, those built upon human

d~sires

and feelings, and those built upon

logical relationships and pragmatic instruments.

As Dewey stated:

Such rules al"e used as criteria or "norms" for judging the
value of proposed modes of behavior. The existence of rules
for valuation of modes of behavior in different fields as
wise or unwise, economical or extravagant, effective or
futile, cannot be denied. The problem concerns not their
existence as general propositions (since every rule of
action is general)·but whether they express only custom,
convention, tradition, or are capable of stating relations
between things as means and other things as consequences,
which relations are themselves grounded in. empirically
ascertained and tested existential relations such are
ususally termed those of cause and effect,2
Ayres used this touchstone of "instrumental" value developed by Dewey
as the framework of his social

though~.

It was possible to answer human

problems, not because "customs" were logical, but because "instrumental tools"

1John Dewey, Theo~ of Valuation (Chicago:

Press, 1939), pp. 12 Thid.' p. 21.

•
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we:re.

The dichotomy of human nature had a valuating side and man could

find direction by

usin~

this side of his humanity.

survival and human betterment.

It was hope for both

But Ayres went much further than Veb1en

and Dewey in showing that culture is the key concept in the "tool process."
· In his discussion of culture, Ayres parallels the thought of Leslie
White, especially in his emphasis upon the development of the symbolic and
cultural nature of man, and he parallels the thought of George Herbert Mead
in his emphasis upon the developing social self.
offers new theories.

But in both cases, he

He extends the dominance of White's tool usage to

include "normative tools."

He extends the "interactionisni" of Mead to

· :i;.nc'i\ide- cultural forms of ·behavlor along side social forms and social institutions.
Whethe:r Ayres Has interested in particular sociological insights
developed by particular sociologists is difficult to know.
must have followed with interest the work of his students,

Surely, he

c.

Wr:i.ght Mills,

Talcott Parsons, Marion Levy, Walter Goldschmidt, Allen Wheelis, David
Hamilton, and Rick Tilman.

·But because Ayres was notoriously lax in

documenting his references, we cannot be sure.

He was very independent

in his judgments and desirous of showing that social thought should and
was bound to reach beyond "Cultural Relativism."

The social sciences above

all had a responsibility, according to Ayres, to indicate that·man was
not merely a social animal with no guidance but.his customs but
was a cultural person and possessed a directi<mal purpose.

rat~~r

Man was both

social and cultural--he was both created as a social being and

the

creator

~-

L -----~---
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of a cultural progression.

And in his cultural role, he was both the creator

of "ceremonial wastes" and the organizer of progressive "technological values."

~r:'i ------ ------

By use of his "technological tools," Ayres believed that mankind could
. . j_

asslwe not only survival but also a better quality of life.
Allen Wheelis used Ayres's conceptual tools in his psychoanalytic
approach to the problems of human existence.

He believed that the main

problem with value is the quality of the values, an assumption that Ayres
often put forth.

Values do not transcend man, but Wheelis believed that

neither. are they the result of random and casual activity.
and judgment is involved in human emotional stability.

Thus, choice

But, ·Wheelis

suggests, that when we come to the most important decisions of life, "the
instrumental process provides no clear~cut answers."3 He states, however,
that there is usually a basis for a partial answera

A dozen psychoanalytic

liste~~ng to the same case material
are likely to formulate a dozen different estimations of
its unconscious meaning, of its prognostic significance,
and of specific interpretation which should be made. Yet
they may share the same hypotheses and the same empirical
approach. There is some common ground, some area of
"consensual validation," but it is far less extensive than
psychanalytic literature would suggest. Similar instrumental
uncertainty exists in all such borderline areas--in marriage
and child rearing, government and economics, war and peace.
It is at ,iust such junctures, where the known is interlaced
With the unknown, that scientific progress takes pJ.ace and ·
the area of the known is extended. It is extended but ·
slowly in those fields where institutional pressure opposes
each scientific advance; it is extended with accelerating
velocity inthose areas which are free of such opposing
pressure. But the awareness of progress provides no present
answer, and some problems will not wait. One must choose

.3Allen Wheelis, The Quest for Identity (New York1 ·
Company, Inc., 1958),p. 183.-

\v.
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and act. In such circumstances, decisions are apt to be
made by reference to institutional values. One prays,
consults dogma, or t•efers--perhaps umdttingly--to mores.
In psychological terms, the ego ab~dolls the conflict and
appeals to the superego for a verd~ct.
_
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\iheelis praises the

technologic~l

------- - --

propulsion toward the progressive

betterment of mankind but also points out some reservations, quite obviously
dealing with Ayres 1 s strongly worded assurances of
evaluation.

11

technological"

Wheelis did believe that much technological progression was

hampered by "cultural lag."

And he questioned the ''functionalist" model

in sociology by arguing that it has a tendency to distrust chan!!e:

"This_

is the basis which has made equilibrium the central concept of social
studies--the optimum state being 'thought of as equi1ibrium while
disequilibrium is considered as unrtatural and temporary deviation. "5
\'iheelis seemingly tempers though the optimism of .Ayres's "technological
progress." with these conclusionsi
The instrumental solution calls for the elimination of
all institutional coercions. Indeed, some instrumentalists
seem to feel that they only good institutions are, like
Indians, dead ones. But it is generally recognized now that
when institutions are overthrovm by force they are replaced,
not by science,- but by other institutions which may.be more
restrictive than those which were destroyed. Few persons~
therefore, expect a scientific society to be established by
revolution. But science, it is said, is l·nnning the day,
and may soon enable us to dispense altogether with myths
and superstitions as soon as they are generally recognized
as. such, but there is no indication that we will ever lose
altogether the potentiality forgreating superstitions in
the guise of self-evident truth.

4

Ibid., pp. 184-185.

5Ibid,, PP• 199-200.
61bid.' p. 205.
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Ayres was quite perturbed, however, with those who sought to soften

~

9.=-:-:::-_ :::-_:-_-::-::--::_~--:-c-=-------~.;---=-=-

the thrust of "technological progression."
book, Ener_g;y_ and Society:

In his review of Fred Cot.trellis

The Relation Betlveen Energy, Social Change, and

Economic Development, he chided Cottrell for his "fixation on energy and
his treatment of energy-conversion as the whole of the tool-using process."7
He commented further, "By focusing attention upon enercy as a figment. of
nature and energy-con·version as a natrual process, Cottrell diverts
attemtion--his own as well as ours--from the process by which knowledge
grows and skills develop, and by which-accordingly 'energy converters' are
8
brought into existence in any society ...
Still, it appears that Ayres's main criticism of Cottrell's approach
is that it does not sufficiently allow for "guaranteed" technological progression.

Cottrell's book deals with social inhibitors as well as natural

energy depletions, and Ayres was convinced that these were secondary to
the fact that technology would lead the way to better techniques regardless
of social considerations and inhibitors. 9
One additional comment .seems appropriate regarding Ayres's contribution
to social theory.

It has been the tendency in most of the social sciences

of late to view with more respect "decision making" or "judgmental stances."
It seem appraent that Ayres's emphasis upon the "moral agnosticism" of the
social sciences was ahead of its time.

\ihile there are those sociologists

· 7c. E. Ayres, Review of Fred Cottrell's book, ~nerg;y: and Society:
Relation Between Energy, Social ~hange, and Economi~ Develo~ent, The
Southwestern Social Scien~ 9uarterly, (Harch, 1956), p. 4o4.
8Ibid.

9Ibid,

1.h!.
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1r1ho

argue that no value exists except as a social construct, 10 many see

values as human necessities.

Paul Strassman believed that great change

occurred among social scientists on this issue.

He comments:

"wben

~-

~--=-,-----------==-=---

"

~---------------

§
-~~- - - ------;-;-

economists begin raising questions, anthropologists should take it as a
cordial welcome to speak up.

Fortunately, it appears that, under the

promptings of George Peter Murdock, A. V. Kidder, Clyde Kluckhohn, and
~-mnr-crp-orCJgy-b-egan

.

.

to abandon extreme cUltural relativism during

the 194os when Ayres was grousing about it."

11

Certainly, many sociologists

have taken "interpretive" positions, including C. \vright 1"-ilis, Irving
Louis Horowitz; Alvin Gouldner, Norman Birnbaum, Seymour Lipset, Daniel
Bell, Robert Nisbet' and Robin I•I. Will.iams, Jr., to name a few.·

Strassmann

makes these comments about Ayres's contributi.on to interpretive social
thought:
Perhaps Clarence Ayres was simply a belated nineteenthcentury scientific humanist who bravely skirmished against
humbug, cruelty, and squalor with original but unqualified
statements. Perhaps he was simply a displaced philosopher
1r1ho somehow had strayed into economics and found himself
defining technology so broadly that he really should have
called it something else. Perhaps he also did not keep
abreast sufficiently .with progress among his economic
colleagues, who while they had not bathed, were at-least
filling the tub. On the other hand--or at the same time-he migh~ hayz been a man far ahead of his, and our
generatJ.on,
In one sense Ayres's approach to social theory may have seemed too
modest and too simple for sociologists to consider.

Yet, most social

10A.rm.and l~auss, Sociai Problems as Social Hovements, (liew York:
Lippincott Company, 1975), pp. xv-xviii.

J. B.

11w. Paul Strassmann, "Technology: A Culture Trait, A logical Category,
or Virtue Itself7" Journal of Economic Issues, VIII (December, 1974), p. 680.
12 Ibid,

P

p. 684.
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systems are built around themes that are woven fugue-like throughout the
entire fabric.

Freud, with all .of his diversity of themes, talked

-

------------ -

~---

essentiaily of aggression and neurotic behavior counterpoised against l-lork
and love.

The vast field of Group Dynamics, w1. th all of its attempts to

define group interaction, genera11y identifiesbut two basic types of
groups:

(1) those which seek mainly social benefits through interpersonal

contact; and (2) those which are oriented toward task-solving and problemsolving.

vJhile there are many sociological theories about change, including

evolutionary theories, nee-evolutionary theories, cyclical theories,
technological· theories, and others , the tv10 main positions of luterican
sociologists seem to be of the functionalist or the conflict models.
Ayres was consistent in pinpointing the dichotQPlY Within man as
essential to understanding change and man is ability to gain unde1•standing
as to his best welfare.

In doing so, he turned his theme into a multifarious

number of complex parts.

However, his main contention was clear, namely that

one side of man created "ceremonial pat:terns"· as answers to man's basic
problems while the other side created "technological and instru.'IT!ental"
solutions.

It was the latter activity that had survival value, while the

"ceremonial behavior" was counterproductive.
Ayres did not place the stress on the "waste" of human behavior that
he did upon the "tool progression" o{ mankind.
Veblen's theories .of "conspicuous waste" and

But he did at least mention

"v~carious

leisure."

He

mentioned such examples as bric-a-brac, laces, flounces, and furbelows;

.

. 13

silk hats, walking sticks; luxurious dress and "the Easter Parade•"

13Ayres, Soc~et~, pp. 201-202.

....
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It is evident that Veblen had presented voluminous docUl'Tlentation of this
F,-----=-,--------=------

side of man's activity, .Ayres seemed much. more intent upon showing the

~---

~--

"progressive" side of man's behavior, his "tool usage."

The central

thesis of Ayres was persistently evident, namely, that human history shows:
(1) that change occurs by "technological" means and (2) that man's
"technology" provides for progress in his problem-solving abilities and
his search for life-sustaining values.
vfuile it is to Aires's credit that he explained profoundly the
dichotomous nature of man, showing that such a concept was basic to an
understanding of his social and cultural functions, it is the contention
of this writer that his theory of progress is empirically non-demonstrable.
·It appears to this writer that "acceleration" would be a more acceptable
term.

Acceleration does not have value-emphasis in the sense of the term

progress, yet it is not static either; it has a dynamic emphasis.

Goldschmidt

cautions against the use of "progress" as a moral judgment, while still
allowing "acceler_a tion," in the following remarks:
Progress is a value-laden term; it assumes certain values or
goais toward which movement tends. Evolution may be viewed
as progressive, however, only if these goals are specifically
defined as the greater complexity of technical knowledge,
greater capacity to produce, and increased elaboration of the
body politic in perfonning these ends. They do not imply any
moral betterment or greater satisfaction or happiness of the
population. They do involve greater complexity and a higher
degree of specialization in the means of production, but not
necessarily any greater increase in indiVidual capacity or
knowledge or in personal satisfaction of wants. Fundamentally,
it is technology that 1 ~rogresses; it is man's capacity to
produce that evolves.
..

14wal ter Rochs Goldschmidt, ~ian's li_ax: ~ Preface to t.h~ pnderstandin!! of
Human Soci;~;y:, (New York: The Hcrld Fublishing Company, 1959), pp. 107-108.

~-
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Ayres, however, defended a thesis of progress intractably.

He did not
~---

accept an intermediate position of "acceleration" or a context.ualist. position
G

that while some empirical judgment of.technological development and efficiency
could be made other "technological values" are more difficult to assess.
He believed in the known quality of the "tool" and its values.

Social and

cultural values lorere combined and not treated in a contextual relationship.
Ayres could state with utter confidencea
\¥estern science and technology are universally judged to
be superior to those of all peoples and all earlier cultures,
and the vlestern standard of living is universally acclaimed •
not only as good but as the best to which mankind has ever
attained.15
.·
.
. ·
ft.:yres did not state that "technological values" are often the most
successful man has ever known, or "technological values" can be shown tq
'

j

be <effective in many areas, or that "technological solutions" reveal an
"acceleration" throughout human history.

For Ayres, the value of the

"technological tool" was knoWE,, and it was good.· Fol:' him, there was a
progressive pattern to culture:
Indeed, the restoration of the concept of progress is one
of the crying needs of contemporary social science. The
truth is our·agnosticism has gone .too· far. In ridding our
minds of the naive collective representations of the past,
we have gone so far as to deny the intelligibility of any
sort of pattern in cultural development. The successive
layers of artifacts which are laid bare by digging of
archaeologists are not sheer hodge-podge conglomeration~
Each successive layer is somehow related to the ones below
and the ones above, and the relationship ~~ibits some sort
of continuous process. 1-lhatever the function be called
.which differentiates one from another, it is a continuous
function and still differentiats the second layer below.16

15Ayres, Socia~, p. 51•
i6c. E. Ayres, The _Theory_ oX: ~nomic F:!:"ogress (1944; rpt. New ~'ork:
Schocken Books, 19b2'), p. 123.
.
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This statement taken by itself could simply mean that there is evidence that

f;

~---- ---
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man has been able to successfully deal with his environment through a series
of technological'and social adaptations, and that these developments are
seen to be continuous.

~

But Ayres stated his viewpoint on this in more

absolute terms when·he said:

"Everyone knows what better and worse [ita1ics

by Ayrei} mean with reference to tools and all
and 'worseness' by the same standard.

eo le judge such 'betterments'
1
These values are the same for all." 7

This is the crucial problem for interpreting Ayres's theory of progress.
He does not distinguish between proving the efficiency of physical and
mechanical tools and proving the efficiency of normative and social values.
The evaluation is combined.

While there may be

genera~

agreement as to

efficiency of mechanical tools, there is wide disagreement about normative
and social values.
Strassmann recognized this difficulty in evaluating Ayres's theorJ of
progress.

He questions whether technology as Ayres used it means any less

than reason itself, and how can you prove rationality by any empirical
measurement?

It is possible to define physical tools and their function, .

but is it possible to define rationality so that the definition will_ be
acceptable to all?

Strassmann implies that while the parts of an engine

can be measured precisely, statements about excellence and freedom cannot.
The problem with Ayres's interpretation is his mixing of technological
function~

with moral worth and personal satisfaction.

Thus, it would

seem Ayres's use of the term "technology" is so all inclusive, so all
encompassing, as to be amorphous.

1.7Ayres, SC2_ciet;z, p. 8. :
18

Strassmann, pp.

676-677.
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Furthermore, is it possible to eliminate all institutional behavior as

,_...,

c_:
R-=--=-~,--=--=:-_,_---

f,-__::-___:__-_:__-_-_- ___,:_-

being "ceremonial" and "wasteful"?

There is at least some proof that various

cultures meet their social needsby different means; they survive and value
many and varied traditions.
"institutional" patterns?
than Ayres.

How then can value judgments be made about their
Goldschmidt presents a more contextualist outJ ook

He does not posit "cultural relativism" as the only valid

position of the social sciences, nor does he advocate a moral standard, as
Ayres does, but rather he supwrts "alternativism."

Goldschmidt makes clear

that acceleration in technical know-how has more often than not been
recognized to be helpful to man.

But he insists on separating value judgments

of progress from functional possibilities:
• • • In short, despite those who insist that "what was good
enough for father is good enough for me," the chances for
technological innovation to prove itself are relatively good,
both because its ends are relatively less subject to question
and because its effects are more amenable to demonstration •• • 19
And Goldschmidt believes that "institutional" behavior is also useful: to
social organization in varying degrees:
• • • institutions of .social life are instrumentalities •••
they, too, have ends, and ••• some operate bettern than.
others under particular circumstances. They differ from
technical aspects of culture in that their instrumental
character is not self-evident, in that they lack the built-in
basis for self-evaluation. (The distinction is not so sharp
as the statement above implies. Hen do make rational, and
end-oriented choices between alternate institutional patterns.)
Yet even if there is no self-conscious evaluation on the part
of the culture bearers with respect to the instrumental aspects
of their institutions, these end~orien~8d_qualities do render .
them subject to the selective process. · ·
--------

19Goldschmidt, PP• 113-114.

20ibid., pp. 121-122.
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Another problem w:i. th Ayres's theory of progress is the £redicabili t;y of
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"effective" physical tools.

It is not possible to guarantee that a "tool

11

which solves.specific problems originally, such as atomic energy in

5--_-_

·..c._·_ __

providing electrical power, may not in the end work to the detriment of
mankind.

Yet, by using Ayres's criteria, it would be seen as an efficient

tool and useful for all.

This does not indicate "institutional" misuse

either, such as atomic warfare would be, but an unpredictable consequence
of an 11 efficient" and "effective" tool.

Conversely, it seems conceivable

that "institutional" tools in many cases create more effective social
patterns and are not purely "ceremonial."
dichotomous nature of man

impli~s

It would appear that. the

that "technological values" and

"institutional values"·are inexorably intertwined and both serve mankind.
in different ways.
values" are far
"wasteful."

This would not p:r-eclude the judgment that "institutional

more likely to become "ceremonial" in nature and therefore

But while there is great variety of opinion about human values--

sociological, cultural, political, economic,, anthropological, historical, ..
ecological, and so on--there· is in every instance a great amount of consensus
in societies as to functional "institutional" tools.

Without alternativism,

however, judgment would be unidimensional.
Ayres seemed to realize that it was impossible to make definitive
statements

cons~J~r.,n,;i.ng

moral values, but he insisted that it. 1-1as possible

to show what was basic. in understanding moral concepts such as freedom,
equality, security, abundance, and excellence.
value judgments.

In so doing, he did make

To consider but one example he used, that of abundance,

-- --
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he pronounced it good in itself, and then proceeded to show his reasons for
s~pporting

such a moral designation,

The reasons he gave were that abundance
~----=-----=-=------

meant industrial growth, which meant greater amount of goods for all, which
21
led to egalitarianism in a society.
He believed. that these developments .
were good for all cultures.

Such an assumption overlooks the variety of

cultural needs, some latent effects of technological acceleration, the
irreversibility of technological change, and perhaps some psychological
effects which may result due to

misunderstandin~s concernin~

abundance.

Harvard Sociologist Daniel Bell has expressed concern about American society ·
resulting from its being a land of plenty:
American capitalism has lost its traditional legitimacy
which was based on a moral system of reward rooted in a
Protestant sanctification of work. It has substituted a
hedonism which promises a material ease and luxury • • • •
the.characteristic style of an industrial society is
based on the principles of economics and economizing; on
efficiency, least cost, maximization, optimization, and
functional rationality. Yet it is at this point that it
comes into sharpest conflict with cultt~e trends of the
day. The one emphasizes functional rationality, the other,
apocalyptic moods, and antirational modes of behavior, It
is this disjunction Which is the historic crisis of Western
society. This cultural contradiction in the long run, is
the de~pest challenge'to the society.22
But for Ayres abundance was a good in itself.

The social context was

secondary to the value of abundance for all.
A~es

was utopian in his faith in progress.

the direction of "technological" change.

He was optimistic about

Ayres did not think that

"institutional" behavior was a "tool," it was a·substitute, and one that

21Ayres, ~ociety, pp. 229-248.
22Daniel Bell, "The Cultural Contradiction, 11 New Yo:rk T:i.Eles, (August 27,
1970).
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thw&rted human survival and progress.

Conversely, "technological" be:b.avior

enhanced the chances of human survival and enhanced the quality of life

f"""

.
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itself.

The life process showed a cont1.nuum in which the "technolop.:ica.l

process" paved the way for better human values.
· It· is the thesis of this study that Ayres would have presented a more

acce table analytical mode1 had he
stand without "dogmatizing" it.

1e±_±h_e_dicho±.onw-----Of___hu.maP__:__beha~or:L------~-------:-----:-

The two sides of man would both then be

seen as tools vital to the selection of values.

The "technological" side of

:man would still be considered as more capable of demonstrated "efficiency,"
the "ceremonial'' side as more vulnerable to "waste."

But both -sides would be

seen as "tool-producing."· Still, the alternativism would remain:

neither

technological values nor social values would stand alone; they would be
judged with specific ends in mind, "technological efficiency" and "social
function."
But to challenge Ayres's utopian theories is not to minimize his
consistent efforts to show that nian was- basically

a dichotomous

person.

While man may be more complex than his social theory envisions, these two·
sides of man are clearly visible.
this dichotomy, hm-rever.
conside~

Few sociological theories make use of

It t-Tould be helpful if they would at least

it, as they do not where stress is placed mainly upon social

organization or upon cultural development.

Ayres pointed the way to

_a

contextual approach based upon an understanding .-of man's life process.
Certainly, Ayres could have carried out the presentation of man's "instituo.
tional" behavior to much greater lengths, but Veblen had done so.

He wanted to

------------
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show man's "technological tools" and their value.

Ayres's emphasis upon

·!=i:-==.::--:-===
p,~=-~.;':"--=~-=------=-=--=-

social "control" as the means toward greater human freedom is one that
deserves study.

Present

em~~asis

is certainly in this direction, although

~

~----

;--;

~---,:=;---------

techniques for evaluating politicaJ systems is much more complicated than
Ayres admitted.
Ayres probably was more eclectic than most social theorists.
be why it is so challenging to analyze his·sopial thought.

This may

It is his

overall presentation of thedichotomous nature of man and not his
.

.

.

.·

.

.

.

denunciation of "Cultural RelativJ.sm" that s.eems intriguing.
believed that "progress" was

evide~t

\-.'hila he

.from one side of man, his "technological"

side, he probably "lOuld have been more in line with dominant sociological
and anthropological thought had he emphasized the alternativism and
pluralism of this contextual human activity.

His student, Walter Goldschmidt,

.Probably summarizes this position best&
The institutions of modern America, like those of all _
peoples everywhere, are a product of the past, having their
sources deep in history, They are·subject to forces that
change them to fit new situations, both internally and
externally, But these forces are not merely forces for
change~
They tend to direct the character of the transformation to·set the pattern and the style of the-transformed society. Whether or not the transformation is
viable depends upon the accurate calculations_ of those
who minister to the changes and upon the flexibility of
the society to make adjustments.
Such circumstances and such actions have produced the
evolutionary development of the human condition, raising· man to ever greater control of his environment, to ever
larger aggregates of population, to ever more complex
social-systems. They have taken place unrecorded and
unsung in earlier eras; they continue to take place.
For modern society is not the end product of such
evolutionary development; it is merely at some stage
along man's Hay. 23

23Goldschnrl.dt, p. 236.
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